アラブの春及びシェール革命以降のサウジアラビア・イラン間の勢力均衡及び抑止 by アルシャマリ, スフォグ
  
Doctoral Dissertation  
 
Balance of Power and Deterrence between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Era 
of Post-Arab Uprisings and Shale Oil Revolution 
March 2017 
 
Doctoral Program in Policy Science  
Graduate School of Policy Science  
Ritsumeikan University 
  
 
ALSHAMMARY Sfoug Faraj H 
 
 
 
  
  
Doctoral Dissertation reviewed 
by Ritsumeikan University 
 
Balance of Power and Deterrence between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Era 
of Post-Arab Uprisings and Shale Oil Revolution 
アラブの春及びシェール革命以降の 
サウジアラビア・イラン間の勢力均衡及び抑止 
March 2017 
2017年 3月 
 
Doctoral Program in Policy Science, Graduate School of Policy Science  
Ritsumeikan University 
立命館大学大学院政策科学研究科政策科学専攻博士後期課程 
 
 
Alshammary Sfoug Faraj H 
アルシャマリ  スフォグ 
 
Supervisor：Professor Noboru Miyawaki 
甲号：研究指導教員：宮脇 昇 教授 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract of Doctoral Dissertation 
 
Balance of Power and Deterrence between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Era 
of Post-Arab Uprisings  
Doctoral Program in Policy Science 
Graduate School of Policy Science 
Ritsumeikan University 
 
アルシャマリ  スフォグ 
ALSHAMMARY Sfoug Faraj H 
 
The political situation in the Middle East is still one of the main concerns for the rest of the world because of the 
vital interests of the global economy, world energy stability, and the state of international peace. Dramatic, ongoing 
developments in the past few years—specifically the period that followed the Arab uprisings—have changed the dynamics 
of politics, alliances, and disputes in the region. Other important factors have contributed to those changes as well, such as 
US withdrawing from the region as “Gulf Police” to counterbalance Iran’s influence due to the revolution of shale oil and 
gas in the United States, the emergence of the concept of the Asian pivot, and the P5+1–Iran nuclear agreement. These 
factors combined have reduced the United States’ desire to remain responsible for Gulf security. Thus, the shape of policies 
in the Middle East will be defined mainly by the balance of power and deterrence between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as it has 
been for decades. I try to analyze the balance of power in the Gulf region in the era of post-Arab uprisings and US 
withdrawal. In particular, the rapid occurrence of events has increased the demand for research that addresses and 
understands those alterations. I find that recent developments in the Middle East have forced Saudi Arabia, mainly, and 
some members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to shift their policy to be more independent and to adopt an 
assertive neorealist doctrine to keep the status quo in the region. Saudi Arabia has started taking major steps to develop its 
military capabilities and has also tried to change the map of alliances in the Middle East by forming a pan-Arab force and 
creating a new Arab coalition, including some of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar) plus Jordan, 
Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan, which played an important role in Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to confront Iranian 
expansion in the Arab world. On the other hand, Iran will have a greater budget after removing the UN sanctions related to 
its nuclear file and unfreezing assets, thus giving Iran the capabilities to finance its proxy wars in the region, which may 
thus augment the intensity of the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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Introduction 
 
Politics in the Gulf region involve multidimensional perspectives and combined 
factors.In order to build a comprehensive vision of the subject, we should touch on the 
historical background and the local and external factors that led to the current policies in the 
region. This includes the local factors of competition between Arabs and Persians, such as the 
first is sectarian issues and the Sunni–Shia tension, the Second is the history of the Arab–
Persian dispute, and the third is the cultural and ethnic competition. Regarding external 
factors, I will discuss the fourth factor which is the external forces responsible for the 
security of the region historically, mainly the Ottoman Empire in the 1500s, the British 
Empire from the early eighteenth century for 150 years, and then the United States after 
World War II. 
If the researcher wishes to discuss the first factor which is sectarian issues and the 
Sunni–Shia relationship, he needs to go back in history more than 1,400 years to an episode 
that occurred after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, in 632 CE. All 
Muslims believe Mohammed was the last messenger; he had no male children alive when he 
died, only daughters. Also, he did not leave a will indicating who would be his successor and 
the next leader of Muslims.1 After his death in Medina, there were two types of his 
companions in the city. Al Anssar, which means “the supporters” in Arabic, were the original 
people of Medina who supported the Prophet when he immigrated to there. Al Anssar are 
mainly composed of two tribes: the Aws and the Khazraj.2The second group of companions 
was called Al Muhajirun, which means “the immigrants” in Arabic. They were not originally 
from Al Medina but followed the prophet Mohammed or even immigrated from Makkah to 
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Medina before his immigration. The Prophet immigrated in 622 CE after escaping 
assassination in his hometown, Makkah, where Muslims were being harassed and tortured at 
that time.3 Most of the well-known companions of Al Muhajirun came from the Quraysh of 
Makkah (the same tribe as Mohammed), who, at the beginning of Islam, were considered the 
biggest enemy of Muslims.4Therefore, Al Medina was like a safe haven for Muslims, 
especially Muhajirun. After the death of Mohammed, Al Anssar held a meeting to select the 
new leader of the Muslims in a place called Sagifah (or Sagifah Bani Saidah). They planned 
to select the head of Khazraj, Saad Ibn Obadah, as the new Muslim leader. The news reached 
Umar ibn Alkhatab, one of the prominent leaders of the Muslims from Al Muhajirun. He 
discussed it with Abu Bakr, the closest man to Prophet Mohammed, and decided to go to 
Sagifah before Al Anssar selected the new leader. Umar wanted to talk, but Abu Bakr stopped 
him and gave a good speech to Al Anssar in which he praised their effort to support the 
prophet Mohammed during his life. He explained that the Arabs found it difficult to accept 
new leaders from outside the tribe of Mohammed because even before Islam the Quraysh 
were the leaders of the Arabs, and the coming of Islam affirmed this, as the Prophet was also 
from the Quraysh. Therefore, Abu Bakr asked Al Anssar to support the new caliph (the 
successor of Mohammed) as they had supported the Prophet.5One of the Anssar suggested an 
alternative of having one leader from the Quraysh and the next one from the Anssar, but the 
suggestion was dropped by Al Muhajirun. Therefore, Abu Bakr asked the Anssar to select 
either Umar or Abo Ubiedah, but Umar insisted on selecting Abu Bakr as the new leader of 
the Muslims. He took a bay’ah (oath of allegiance), and the rest of the Muslims in Sagifah 
followed, selecting Abu Bakr as the first caliph for Muslims after Prophet Mohammed.6 
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The selection of Abu Bakr was not surprising among the Sunni because his name and 
title, Abu Bakr Alsadeeq, meant “the believer.” He was the first man who believed 
Mohammed’s prophecy and was the closest man to the Prophet. In fact, Mohammed was 
asked in his life who he liked most among his male companions, and he replied that it was 
Abu Bakr. The Holy Quran also mentioned Abu Bakr as the companion of Prophet 
Mohammed during their immigration from Makkah to Medina, as well as when the Quraysh 
followed them to kill the Prophet while he was hiding in a cave.7 Quran Chapter Al-Tawba 
Verse No. 40 states: 
(If you help him (Muhammad SAW) not (it does not matter), for Allah did indeed help 
him when the disbelievers drove him out, the second of two, when they (Muhammad 
SAW and Abu Bakr) were in the cave, and he (SAW) said to his companion (Abu 
Bakr): “Be not sad (or afraid), surely Allah is with us.” Then Allah sent down His 
Sakinah (calmness, tranquility, peace, etc.) upon him, and strengthened him with 
forces (angels) which you saw not, and made the word of those who disbelieved the 
lowermost, while it was the Word of Allah that became the uppermost, and Allah is 
All-Mighty, All-Wise.)8 
 
The Prophet mentioned that Abu Bakr was the first person who would enter heaven 
from the nation of Mohammed.9 
The events that followed the death of Prophet Mohammed proved that Abu Bakr’s 
plan was to keep the caliphate among the Quraysh; otherwise it would lead to the 
disintegration of the unity of the Arabs and Muslims because other tribes would not allow 
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anybody to be a leader unless he was from the tribe of Mohammed.10The Sunni claimed that 
Ali, the cousin of Mohammed, accepted Abu Bukr as the first caliph, while the Shia said that 
he had been forced to accept him. Regardless, both agreed that Ali was not present at the 
meeting in Sagifah.11 
It is worth mentioning that there was no use of these terms (Shia or Sunni) after the 
death of Mohammed directly, but the term Shia started to be used frequently around the time 
of Ali, about 35 years after the death of the Prophet. Therefore, the dispute between the Sunni 
and the Shia after Prophet Mohammed’s death was retrospective. The Shia believed that the 
cousin of Prophet Mohammed and the husband of his beloved daughter Fatima, Ali ibn Abi 
Talib, should have been the first caliph of the Muslims after Mohammed,12 while the Sunni 
thought the Shoura, or election, should have decided who would be the caliph. However, 
during the Sagifa meeting, Ali and his wife, Fatima, were busy preparing for the funeral of 
Prophet Mohammed, therefore he wasn’t a candidate to be the first caliph.13 
The story of forcing Ali to accept Abu Bakr as caliph seems odd because both Sunnis 
and Shias know very well that nobody could have forced Ali to do something he didn’t want 
to do. It is well known in Muslim history, and both Sunnis and Shias agree, that Ali was a 
courageous man and a strong warrior.14 Shias said the Prophet Mohammed endorsed Ali as 
the next caliph in his life in the Hadiath of the pond of Khumm when Prophet Mohammed 
went back to Al Medina from Makkah after he took his last farewell pilgrimage. He made a 
speech and stated, “Who am I his Maula (master), Ali is his Maula (master),” and this is why 
Shias celebrate this day.15 Sunnis, however, think that the event was just a sequence of a long 
story about when Prophet Mohammed sent Ali to Yemen as the leader of a group of 
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companions. Ali was decisive with them, and when they returned to the Prophet, some of 
them complained about his behavior. After the Prophet heard both sides of the story, he found 
that Ali had made the right decision, and therefore, he gave a speech.16 
The succession of Mohammed has been in dispute for 1,400 years, and both parties—
Sunni and Shia—claim they are right. After Abu Bakr’s death, the second caliph was Umar, 
one of the most important strategic and military leaders in the history of Muslims. The Islamic 
State expanded greatly, and he defeated the two biggest empires at that time: the Persian 
Empire and the Roman Empire. The role of Umar and his relationship with Persia have been 
very controversial issues among Shia and Sunni Muslims.17Shias, especially from Iran, blame 
Umar for not handing over the leadership of Muslims to Ali after the death of Abu Bakr, and 
they believe Ali was the legitimate leader. Sunnis, on the other hand, argue that the 
relationship between Ali and Umar was excellent; otherwise, Umar would not have married 
Ali’s daughter, which showed that they were very close. Umar considered Ali a very close 
adviser and sought his wisdom on important matters. Umar once said that if Ali hadn’t 
existed, Umar would have perished.18This well-known statement shows how Umar depended 
on Ali in handling state affairs. Umar even dictated in his will that there should be an election 
to choose the caliph after him, and he asked six of the Muslim leaders to select the next caliph 
(Shura).  
Muslims finally elected Uthman Ibn Affan. His nickname, Thou Alnourain, means 
“the man with two lights” in Arabic because he married two of Prophet Mohammed’s 
daughters. Therefore, he was a son-in-law of Prophet Mohammed,19like Ali, but Shias refused 
the election. They believed Ali was the legitimate caliph, more than the three previous 
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caliphs—Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman—and they thought Uthman’s marriage to two of the 
Prophet Mohammed’s daughters was not enough reason, claiming that they had been forced 
marriages.  
Under the leadership of Uthoman, the Islamic state expanded more, but at the end of 
his reign, fitna (troubles and disorder) occurred. Thugs came to Al Medina to complain of 
corruption among governors in the provinces, and they surrounded Uthman’s house for a 
period before finally killing him. It is worth mentioning that Ali was so concerned about the 
safety of Uthman that he posted his sons, Al Hassan and Al Hussein, to guard him; thus, the 
relationship was strong between the two sons-in-law of Prophet Mohammed.20 
After the assassination of Uthman, Ali became caliph. He tried to change the 
controversial governors of the provinces, who had many complaints against them. Some 
people wanted him to take revenge on the people who had killed Uthman. The governor of 
Laven (most of present-day Syria) in Damascus, Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan, refused the 
orders of Ali as the new caliph.21 Thus, Muslims became divided into two groups, some with 
Muawiyah and the majority with Ali. Finally, they met at the battle of Siffin, which is famous 
in the history of the Muslims. Ali’s army almost defeated Muawiyah, but Muawiyah escaped 
from the situation by putting the Holy Quran on the tips of his soldiers’ spears, which meant 
they wanted the rule of the Quran. As a result of the arbitration, the battle was stopped and the 
two armies left, one toward Damascus and the other (Ali’s) toward Kufa. This was the 
beginning of Shiism.  
 The people who supported Ali called themselves Shiite Ali, which means “supporters 
of Ali.” Then Ali was assassinated in 661CE after five years of leadership as caliph, by 
Kharijite Abdul Rahaman Ibn Muljim. Shias consider Ali is first imam and legitimate caliph, 
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and he was from Ahl Al-Bayt, which means “the house of Prophet Mohammed.” After the 
death of Imam Ali, his son Al Hassan took over for several months. Eventually, Al Hassan 
reached an agreement with Mauiyah, abdicating his position to Mauiyah in order to unify the 
Muslims. However, Al Hassan imposed conditions that Mauiyah didn’t follow. For example, 
after Mauiyah, the Muslim leadership role was not supposed to be hereditary, but Mauiyah 
sought to make his son Yazied the next caliph. Hussein Ibn Ali, the son of Ali, refused this 
plan and went to Iraq, looking for support. He did not find actual support from the Iraqis, but 
the army of Yazied, son of Mauiyah, followed him and fought him. The army killed people 
around Hussein Ibn Aliin the Karbala battle; then, Hussein Ibn Aliwas killed by Shamar ibn 
thi Al-Joshan by beheading, which is considered one of the biggest crimes in Muslim history 
among both Shias and Sunnis. This crime was condemned by both Sunnis and Shias because 
Yazied’s army had killed the beloved grandson of Prophet Mohammed, who was of the most 
royal blood of Arabs and Muslims. His mother was Fatima, the beloved daughter of Prophet 
Mohammed, and his father was Ali, the cousin of Prophet Mohammed and fourth caliph.22As 
a result, the rift increased between the Shias and Sunnis. 
Surprisingly, there are many mistakes and misunderstandings in the history of Sunni–
Shia tension in foreign sources and books, mainly regarding the beliefs of Sunnis and Shias 
such as the beginning of dispute and the divisions of Sunnis23; therefore, I have discuss this 
topic in detail and it is good to clarify some points regarding these issues. First, Sunnis 
believe that Ali was the right fourth caliph of the Muslims and that Mauiyah made a mistake 
when he fought Ali. By consensus, all Sunnis call the first four caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, 
Uthman, and Ali) the Rashidun, which means “rightly guided caliphs,” but they have not 
given this title to Mauiyah. In addition, all Sunnis agree that Ali was better than 
 
 
 
8 
 
Mauiyah.24The second issue is that Sunnis believe that the rightly guided caliphs were on 
Ali’s side during the war between Mauiyah and Ali because the Prophet Mohammed stated 
clearly that Ammar Ibn Yasser, a companion of Prophet Mohammed and one of the 
supporters of Ali, would be killed by a transgressing group (Mauyeah’s army) during the 
Battle of Siffin.25 The third issue is that all Sunnis have high respect for Al Bayt, the house of 
Mohammed, and all Sunnis say “o God, bless Mohammed and Al Bayt” five times in their 
prayers. 
The difference between Sunnis and Shias is that Sunnis have refused to curse any 
companion of Prophet Mohammed because he said not to. Prophet Mohammed knew very 
well what would happen in the future after his death and gave many prophecies about it, such 
as predicting Ammar ibn Yasser’s death. Yet, he mentioned that the best generation of 
Muslims was his generation; therefore, it is difficult for Sunnis to damn any companion of 
Prophet Mohammed,26even if the companion did make mistakes. They believe the Lord holds 
people accountable, while Shias—mostly the Twelvers group—damn a lot of companions of 
Prophet Mohammed, even the first three caliphs and the wife of Mohammed, Aiysha, whom 
Sunnis consider the mother of all believers since she was the closest wife to Prophet 
Mohammed. Furthermore, Sunnis consider any cursing or insults to any companions as an 
insult to all Muslims, especially since the dispute is 1,400 years old and should already be 
forgotten. Also, they think the leadership should be determined by Islamic election (Shoura), 
not hereditary rule, as the Shias believe.  
 From the historical events—such as the marriage of Umar to the daughter of Ali, 
despite Shias claims that it was a forced marriage,27 and the sons of Ali protecting Uthman’s 
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life—we can devise that the relations between Ali and the first three caliphs were very good. 
The Sunnis want to stop this brutal dispute, and they have asked why the Sunnis should be 
blamed for Kufa City’s mistakes and the betrayal of Al Hussein when the people of Kufa 
didn’t protect him. The Shias, mainly the scholars, remember this story every year as part of 
their religious rituals and remember the revenge of Al Hussein.28 
Since then, Muslims have been divided into two groups: The majority group is called 
Sunni and the minority group is called Shia.  
Shias are further divided into three types: Twelvers, Zaidiyya, and Ismailis. 
1. Twelver Shias, or Ithnv’ashariyyah’, comprise the biggest group of Shias and are 
located mainly in Iran and Iraq. They are called the Twelvers because they believe that twelve 
imams were selected by God from the descendants of the first imam, Ali; these twelve are 
infallible, according to the Twelver Shia beliefs.  
2. The Zaidiyya sect is named after Zayd ibn Ali. Followers are also called the Fivers 
because they follow five imams. The Zaidi believe the imams are fallible and the selection of 
imams can be nonhereditary and performed by the bay’at. Zaydi is the closest Shia group to 
the Sunnis, and they don’t damn the first three caliphs. The Zaidi are located mainly in 
Yemen.  
3. Ismailis are named after Isma’il ibn Jafar, the older son of Ja’far al-Sadiq. In this 
way, they differ from the Twelvers, who follow Ja’far’s younger son, Musa al-Kadhim. 
Ismailis believe that Ismail didn’t die but rather that his father faked a funeral to protect him. 
They say he had the right to be the imam after his father. They are called the Seveners 
because they follow seven imams.29 
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 Sunnis compose the majority of Muslims, following all four caliphs after the death of 
Prophet Mohammed. They have only one group, but there is a misunderstanding among 
Western historians that they are divided into four branches.30 All Sunnis have the same 
principles, but they have four schools for interpreting the details of the laws of Islam. The 
four schools are Hanafi, Shafi’ite, Malikite, and Hanbalite. Sunnis have the choice to select 
any school they wish at any time, as well as more than one school for any law, whereas Shias 
can’t convert from one branch to another because the main principles are so different.31 
Despite the disagreements between Sunnis and Shias started after the Prophet 
Muhammad’s death and regarded his legitimate successor. However, the disputes resolved 
quickly historically, and ordinary Sunnis and Shias have lived peacefully together throughout 
most of Islamic history. This is because of intermarriage and blood relations between Shias 
and Sunnis; the wisdom of Al-Bayt imams, such as Jaafar Sadegh; and the huge difference in 
number between the two groups, with Shias representing a small minority compared to 
Sunnis.32 
I have already mentioned the sectarian factor, but the second factor which is historical 
one has also played an important role in the competition. Umar is considered a milestone 
leader in the history of the competition between Arabs and Persians. He was the strategic 
leader who collapsed the Persian Empire and made Persians subordinate of Arabs until now. 
Therefore, even recently some Persian writers have blamed him for collapsing the Persian 
civilization. Before the Islamic states, a huge number of Arabs were simply followers who 
showed loyalty and obedience to the Persian Empire; the only exception was the battle of Dhi 
Qar, when the Arabs united and defeated the Persian Empire for a short time before the 
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Islamic states.33Otherwise, the Persian Empire dominated the Arabs for centuries until Umar 
came and collapsed the Persian Empire forever. Persia became a state belonging to the Arabs 
for several centuries. Eventually, Umar was assassinated by a Persian worker in Al Medina 
while he was praying in the mosque, which was considered by some Persians to be revenge 
for what he had done to the Persian Empire.  
 If we discuss the history of the Arabian–Persian wars, we also need to discuss the 
Muslim conquest of Persia. Umar was the mastermind behind the Arab conquest of Iran, 
which led to the disappearance of the Sasanian Empire, and the Muslims started their war 
against the Sasanian Empire with an army led by a well-known general, Khalid ibn Alwaleed. 
He made some progress in Iraq, but he was shifted to the Syrian front, and the Muslims lost 
their gains. In 636, Umar sent another famous leader to Persia, Saad ibn Abi Waqqas, and he 
defeated the Persians at the battle of Qadisiyyah, gaining almost all of the western part of the 
Sasanian Empire. Arab Muslims continued progressing in Persia, and finally, the Battle of 
Nihawand was the decisive battle that ended the real power of the Sasanian Empire and 
caused the last Sassanid emperor, Yazdgerd III, to flee. By 651, the Sasanian Empire was 
finished forever, and declined of Zoroastrian religious began in Persia.34 
 The third competition factor isthe cultural and ethnic issues. If we review the 
opinion of Iranian authors—such as Sadeq Chubak, Nader Naderpour, Mehdi Akhavan Sales, 
and Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh—to examine the cultural dimension of the rivalry, we will 
see that they consider themselves other-than-Arabs and think they are different from Arabs in 
all aspects: culture, thoughts, and even religion They stress nationalism and ideological 
factors that represent a world of difference from the Arabs.35 
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Even in their stories and novels they describe the Arabs in a very bad way. Sadeq 
Hedayat, for example, describes Arabs as “dark-skinned, dirty, diseased, ugly, stupid, cruel 
and shameless, bestial and demonic. Moreover, Hedayat portrays present-day Iranian Muslims 
as corrupt and hypocritical. Only his Sassanid Iranians are attractive, courageous, intelligent, 
cultured and virtuous.”36 As can be seen, even Iranian authors think the golden age of Iran 
was before Islam and Islamic invaders (Arabs) destroyed their culture, which is significant if 
we look at the Iranian state as an Islamic state, as the Iranian regime claim to be. Some 
Iranians even believe that the Iranian race is superior to the Semitic race (Arabs). In addition, 
Mehdi Akhavan  says “According to ‘The Ending of the Shahnameh,’ the ending of 
Zoroastrian Iranian cultures with the defeat of the Sassanid Empire and the coming of Islam 
has resulted in ruin and despair, which can be resolved only by returning to Iran’s pre-Islamic 
golden age. The Iranian Self was pure, bright and beautiful, but has been corrupted by the 
Arab Other, false, dark, and evil.”37Sadeq Chubak describes Arabs as ugly and Iranians as 
corrupted by Arabs’ hypocrisy in reference to Islam, for Chubak believes they founded “the 
institution of Shi’i Islam in Iran only as a tool for oppression.”38 
On the other hand, there are many authors who have less aggressive views about 
Arabs or even some positive ideas, but it is worth mentioning that the majority of Iranian 
authors look at Arabs as having a different culture that has many opposite characteristics to 
the Iranian culture. 
While the fourth factor is the historical external power can be divided into three eras, 
the first real rift between Sunnis and Shias in the region started during the competition 
between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. Ismail I initiated a religious policy to recognize 
Shiism as the official religion of the Safavid Empire. Then, the Safavids declared Shia Islam 
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to be the state religion and used proselytization to force a lot of Sunni Muslims in Iran to 
convert to Shiism.39 The fact that modern Iran remains an officially Shiite state is a direct 
result of Ismail I’s actions, while the Ottoman Empire is Sunni. Shah Ismail I of the Safavid 
dynasty destroyed the tombs of Abu-Hanifa and the Sufi Abdul Qadir Gilani in 1508. In 1533, 
the Ottomans fought back and defeated the Safavids in Iraq and rebuilt the Sunni mosque.40 
 After the Ottoman–Safavid dispute, the British Empire came as a protector of the 
Gulf, as most of Gulf States were called at that time British protectorates. For about one and a 
half centuries—from the early 1820s until about the 1970s—Great Britain was the dominant 
power in the Gulf region. The British controlled the major political and economic issues, as 
they needed to ensure the safety and stability of the trading paths through their colonies in 
India, the Gulf, and the Middle East.41In this way, the East India Company played a leading 
role in the formation of policies and economics in the region and had a huge influence—to the 
degree that it made a state within a state (the British Empire).42 
 After the British Navy won battles against the Qawasim, the dominant rulers of the 
region (now known as Al Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah), and enforced an antipiracy treaty in 
1820, the rest of the rulers in the region followed suit. The British Empire created a political 
position for the lower Gulf. It was first located on Qashim Island but was then was moved to 
Bushire; it was united with the political agent there to form a high British official position that 
was practically like the ruler of the Gulf region. He controlled and coordinated all activities in 
the region. Most the Gulf Arab states—Al Sharijah, Ras Al Khaimah, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
‘Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait—were part of 
Britain’s Indian Empire. Great Britain controlled most oil concessions in the region, and no 
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concession could be issued unless it was approved by British officials. Therefore, the British 
could grant oil works to British companies. In 1947, the British political resident moved to 
Bahrain. Great Britain was responsible for the security and stability of the Gulf States, and 
even after the expansion of oil wealth among the Gulf States, Britain asked the Gulf people to 
invest their revenues in Britain.43 
After World War II, the United States became the new patron of the region and took 
upon itself the duty to protect the Gulf States in return for a smooth oil supply to move the 
world economy. Thus, the third era is the US presence in the region after World War II. As a 
result, the United States has had a huge influence on the politics in the region. There have 
been some changes recently, but because of the importance of the US’s role in the region and 
its continuous effect, this paper will discuss US role in detail when I mention Saudi–Iranian 
relations in the twentieth century. It is worth mentioning, however, that in modern times the 
Sunni–Shia competition is defined by the Saudi–Iranian rivalry.  
In terms of the balance of power in the Gulf, the researcher will find that most of 
the available literature discussing the issue has concentrated on the period preceding major 
recent events in the region, such as the surprising events of the Arab Spring, the changes in 
US policy in relation to the Middle East, and the shift of the United States toward Asia (the 
so-called “pivot to Asia”). The emerging warm relationship between Iran and the United 
States regarding nuclear file negotiation was a dramatic modification to the way that strategic 
policy in the region has been since World War II. In the short space of time since this 
development, political authors have not had the chance to analyze the changes in the balance 
of power. In addition, the modifications in the Middle East are part of an ongoing process that 
continues to reshape the area, and we can see clearly that some countries’ international 
borders have been dissolved, such as those of Syria and Iraq. Therefore, I tried in this research 
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to answer the question of how recent events have changed the doctrine of Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to keep the status quo and the balance of power in their 
favor (versus Iran) and to maintain a peaceful state in the region. I have chosen to discuss this 
subject because it is vital to the rest of the world to be reassured about the global economy 
and the energy supply in the Gulf area, which contains almost half of the world’s oil and gas 
reserves. The world, especially Asia, depends significantly on the Gulf region for its energy 
supply and as an important trade route to the rest of the world. Also, the Gulf region plays a 
significant role in international security, peace, and the war on terror; this is why this updated 
research has been significantly important for global policy making. The Gulf–Iranian conflict 
is considered by many authors to be similar to the Saudi–Iranian competition because both 
countries are responsible for mainly defining the intensity of the struggle. And traditionally, 
among political authors such as Steven Walt and Paul Aarts, neorealism theory has been used 
to explain politics in the Middle East, especially the Saudi–Iranian dispute44; therefore, from a 
neorealism prospective, I have tried to understand the effects of new developments, such as 
the Arab uprisings and US withdrawing from the region, on the balance of power there. I also 
tried to apply the features of neorealism to the competitors and their behavior in the 
international political system. I have used combined qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, including a literature review and interviews with experts in the field. I have also 
tried to use many scientific methods to measure the power of the two nations to ensure that I 
reach a high degree of objectivity in my analysis and conclusions. For example, I have 
utilized well-known equations to measure the power of nations and have used indicators from 
the international military research institutes, United Nations and World Bank,to compare 
several factors of hard and soft power, such as military assets, military spending, the human 
development index, and the worldwide governance indicators.  
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This thesis is divided into seven chapters. I began with this introduction as shown 
above, which provides a historical sequence of events for the past 1,400 years to show the 
background and the roots of the dispute. Then, in the first chapter I discuss the history of the 
Saudi–Iranian relationship from the twentieth century until the present, its stages, and the 
recent developments in the region. The second chapter contains the importance of the region 
for the rest of the world, especially as the main energy supplier for global energy demands, as 
well as the important role of the region in the war on terror. The third chapter discusses 
theoretical realism and neorealism and their explanations. The fourth chapter contains the 
application of neorealism to the competitors. The fifth chapter provides a definition of power, 
as well as equations to measure the power and balance of power among the region’s nations; 
presents calculations; and compares the power of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United States, 
also the economic indicators and military assets of the Saudi Arabia and Iran, and then the 
sixth chapter discusses in detail the developments in the region, their effects on the external 
balance of power and the strategies of the Saudi Arabia and Iran in this dispute. Finally, I 
close with seventh chapter by drawing my conclusion.  
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Chapter 1: History of the Region and Modern Events 
 
1.1 Pre-Arab Spring History of the Rivalry between the Saudi Arabia and Iran 
Throughout the history of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, U.A.E., Qatar and 
Oman)–Iranian relationship, the main parameter has been the Saudi–Iranian relationship.45 
Therefore, the rest of the GCC refers to Saudi Arabia as the “Big or Grand Sister.” 46There are 
two important stages in the history of the Saudi–Iranian relationship: Stage one, which 
covered the period from the early twentieth century until the 1979 revolution, is called the 
pre-1979 revolution stage. The second stage covers the period from the 1979 revolution until 
the Arab Spring and is called the post-1979 revolution stage. 
 
1.1.1 Pre-1979 Revolution Stage 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran began in 1928, when Habibullah Hoveyda 
was appointed the first ambassador. During the reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi from 1921 to 
1941, Iranian passports bore the phrase “This allows the holder of the passport to visit all the 
countries except the Hijaz.”(Hijaz is west region of Saudi Arabia) In 1929, then a treaty of 
friendship was established with Iran. In 1930 saw the opening of the Iranian Embassy in 
Jeddah, which involved only countries with minimal understanding of the issue of 
nonaggression. A Saudi delegation team was sent to Tehran to negotiate a treaty of friendship 
and proposed an alliance between the two countries, but the Iranian government rejected this 
proposal. Saudi King Abdulaziz made an effort to support relations with Iran and, in May 
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1932, sent his son, Prince Faisal, who was his deputy in the Hijaz, to be head of the official 
delegation to Tehran.47 
After the marriage of the Shah Pahlavi of Iran with Princess Fawzia, the sister of King 
Farouk of Egypt, the Shah started liking the Arabs. That led to an improvement in the Iranian 
relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 1957, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi visited Saudi 
Arabia, including Mecca and Medina, in spite of secularism, which encouraged Mr.Omar 
Saqqaf (former Saudi minster of foreign affair) to visit Tehran. King Faisal rewarded Iran for 
its position by visiting Tehran in December 1967. The significance of the visit was that Iran 
regained its mind in the eyes of the Arabs.48The relationship of Saudi Arabia and Iran with 
great powers, especially the United States at that time, was known as the Twin Pillars Strategy 
(TPS). The United States had a strategic understanding with Riyadh on the one hand and 
Tehran on the other.49 These understandings were to protect US interests and ensure stability 
in the region. However, the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia was a bumpy one at 
times, such as when the shah refused the independence of Bahrain and kept Bahrain’s seats in 
the Iranian parliament empty, which caused a sharp conflict between the two countries in 
1968. This continued until Bahrain’s independence in 1971.50The Saudi–Iranian relationship 
also experienced some tension in the 1970s because of the 1973 oil embargo by the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), when Iran continued 
supplying Israel and South Africa with oil.51However, the relationship became smoother in 
1975 when Saudi Arabia and Iran supported Pakistan in its war against India over the 
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Kashmir region. The two countries felt that the Western powers had betrayed Pakistan; 
therefore, they showed strong support of Pakistan.52 
 
1.1.2 Post-Iranian Revolution 1979 Stage 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the fall of the shah, the new regime (Khomeini’s 
regime) launched hostile statements against Saudi Arabia and the GCC, but what made the 
Gulf officials worried was Iran’s intention to export its revolution (new expansionist doctrine 
of Iran) to the other side of the Gulf.53 
 
1.1.2.1 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War 
Iranians accused the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia, of supporting Iraq during the 
1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, an accusation that Saudi Arabia never publicly denied.54 
1.1.2.2 1987 Incidents in Saudi Arabia 
During the Hajj season in 1987, a clash between Saudi security and Iranian pilgrims 
resulted in the death of 402 pilgrims, the majority of whom were Iranian. Angry protesters in 
Tehran attacked the Saudi Embassy and the Kuwaiti Embassy. A Saudi diplomat was killed 
due to severe wounds after he was thrown from an embassy window. As a result, the Saudi 
king cut diplomatic relations with Iran in 1988. Relations were resumed in 1991.55 
 
1.1.2.3 1997 First Saudi Visit 
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King Abdullah (the crown prince at that time) visited Iran for an Islamic summit in 
December 1997, which was the first time such a high-level Saudi official had visited Iran 
since the 1979 revolution.56Which refers to the relation improvement between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran  
 
1.1.2.4 1999 Good Times 
The Saudi–Iranian relationship improved after the election of President Mohammad 
Khatami in 2001; this was considered by many to be the most stable period of political 
relations between the two nations to date. Then, the Iranian president visited Saudi Arabia for 
the first time since the Khomeini regime had taken over in Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran even 
signed a security agreement.57 
Saudi–Iranian rapprochement was significant during the late 1990s and Khatami’s 
period. In 1999, trade exchange reached $150 million, while total investments in many 
projects reached $280 million. During the collapse in oil prices in the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran cooperated to stabilize the oil market. An Iranian cultural week was even held at 
King Fahad Cultural Center in Saudi Arabia.58This period can give a good example about the 
cooperation potential between the two countries if the political leaders agree especially with 
presence of moderate governments of Khatami who show less interest to do destabilizing 
actions in the region. 
 
1.1.2.5 2003 after US invasion of Iraq 
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After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the US administration brought in Shia groups to 
take over Iraq ruling. Saudis were upset that most of the new faces in the government were 
friends and allies of Iran, which increased its influence in Iraq.59 
In 2006, Saudi Arabia accused Hezbollah, a militia group from Iran, of misadventure 
after the war with Israel, which caused huge infrastructure damage in Lebanon. Saudis were 
suspicious that Iran had used proxy war tactics to gain an influence in the region.60 
One of the main reasons for tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran was the nuclear 
file. Saudis believed Iranians were expanding their nuclear capabilities because of military 
proposals to form nuclear weapons, which Iran denied. In 2008, King Abdullah told the 
United States to “cut off the head of the snake,” referring to Iran.61 
 
1.2 Recent Years: Major Changes in the Middle East 
 
1.2.1 Arab Uprisings 
In a discussion of the Arabian Gulf or the Middle East in general, it is necessary to 
specify the time period as either before or after the Arab uprisings (which are sometimes 
referred to as the “Arab Spring”) because they were very important historical events that 
changed the shape of the Middle East. They affected all aspects of life in the region.62The 
Arab uprisings started on December 17, 2010, with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi 
in Tunisia in protest of unfair treatment from the authorities. This sparked demonstrations 
throughout Tunisia.63President Bin Ali was forced to flee the country. Then, demonstrations 
spread throughout almost the entire northern African region to Egypt. Tahrir Square became a 
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symbol of the Egyptian Revolution, which removed President Hosni Mubarak from the 
presidency. The revolution then reached Libya and toppled the regime of the Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi, who was killed by rebels.64It was like a snowball that kept getting bigger 
and bigger; the demonstrations and uprisings spread through many Arab countries. 
Unsurprisingly, the major causes of the uprisings were the same in many Arab states, 
including the economy, failure of the government, corruption, unemployment, and 
injustice.65The uprisings increased in intensity, especially in those countries that were 
suffering from suppression, severe corruption, and a brutal regime, such as Syria and Yemen. 
In Yemen, the revolution eliminated President Ali Saleh’s regime, which had controlled the 
country for more than three decades, at least in thought.66Syria was the biggest human disaster 
in the Middle East; the Syrian Revolution opposed a very brutal regime that used the worst 
methods ever to suppress it. So far, after four years, Assad’s regime has killed more than 
200,000 people, the majority of whom have been civilians. Chemical weapons have been used 
frequently against them.67 
During the Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia and Iran maintained the same policy to 
protect their interests and allies, which caused confrontation in many places in the Middle 
East. Saudis supported the military against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, while 
Iran had a good relationship with the MB.68In Syria, Iran helped Assad’s regime, while the 
Saudis and Qatar helped the revolutionaries.69Bahrain is another place of confrontation, where 
the Saudis and some of GCC interfered with the government and Iran supported the Shias, 
who had a long relationship with Iran.70 
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1.2.2 US Withdrawing from the Region 
Another major event that hit the region in recent years was the United States’ 
withdrawing from the Gulf. For decades following the end of World War II, Gulf oil and a US 
military presence have coincided because of the huge demand for energy sources to support 
the worldwide industrial sector, especially for the biggest economy in the world, the United 
States, which made politicians and Pentagon officials to put the Arabian Gulf region at the top 
of their priorities to ensure the smooth movement of oil.71 
This importance was confirmed after the oil shocks in the ’70s, when the United 
States’ vital need for oil from the Arabian Gulf became clear.72 Consequently, the Jimmy 
Carter Doctrine was a strong commitment to stabilization of the region: “Let our position be 
absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region 
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such 
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”73 
The history of the US–Gulf oil relationship began when Franklin D. Roosevelt hosted 
King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia aboard the USS Quincy on Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake in 
February 1945. The meeting strongly linked Middle Eastern oil with US national security. It 
also significantly helped form the twentieth century’s one of the most important strategic 
relationship, in which the Saudis would supply cheap oil to global markets in exchange for 
US protection.74 
But the situation has changed recently due to many factors, such as the shale oil 
revolution and the pivot to Asia.  
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1.2.3 The Shale Oil Revolution 
Despite the fact that the shale oil and gas revolution occurred mainly in the United 
States, its fallout reflected strongly in the Gulf region, making it a big event in the history of 
the Gulf as well. 
Shale, which is also called kerogen, releases oil-like liquids when it is cracked 
(fracked) by high temperature, pressure, and chemical agents.75 The expansion of the 
development of two techniques, called horizontal drilling and multistage hydraulic fracturing, 
was revolutionary.76 
In 2004, shale oil production was insignificant and did not exceed a half-million 
barrels daily, but it accelerated from 2008 onward to reach about four million barrels per day 
in 2014–2015.77The Energy Information Administration (EIA) expected US production to rise 
by more than 600,000 barrels this year to reach 9.3 million per day in 2015. By 2016, it is 
expected to reach 9.5 million barrels daily.78US production of oil and associated liquids is 
expected to rise to 13.1 million barrels per day by 2019. EIA report indicated that the United 
States’ production will plateau thereafter, but it will maintain its first-place rank for almost a 
decade before it will be lost in about 2030.79The EIA forecast showed that US importation 
will decline from 16% in 2012 to 3% by 2030. This small amount of product can be imported 
from more nearby resources, so if this forecast comes true, then the importance of the Arabian 
Gulf will diminish tremendously for the United States.80Please see figure 1 from the Energy 
Information Administration that showed the forecast of EIA of US energy imports in the 
future.  
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Figure 1. EIA’s forecast of U.S. energy imports  
 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration.81 
 
This huge surge in production has renewed the old, sweet dream of politicians and 
energy decision makers that the United States will be energy independent soon82 so that it no 
longer needs to be concerned about its supply of oil from unstable regions like the Middle 
East. 
Tom Donilon, the US national security advisor, said, “the shale gas/tight oil or simply 
shale revolution has done more than boost economic activity and create jobs at home: it has 
increased government revenue, improved the country’s trade balance, and reduced US 
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dependence on energy imports from politically unstable regions, thus also widening its room 
for diplomatic maneuver.”83 
 
1.2.4 Pivot to Asia 
The Asia-Pacific region is home to 4.3 billion persons, which is about 60% of the 
human population on Earth. According to the World Bank, in 2013, Southeast Asia, the 
Indian subcontinent, Oceania, and the Pacific Rim produced a total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at purchasing power parity of $38.8 trillion.84The developing economies of East Asia 
saw a growth rate of 6.9% in 2014.85 Therefore, the area is a large and important market for 
US interests. For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is a trade agreement 
between some Asian and Pacific countries and the United States, generated a GDP of $11.9 
trillion in 2012 among non-US TPP partners, and these countries have a population of about 
478 million, which is larger than the US population.86 
Since former Secretary of State Ms. Hillary Clinton’s famous article “America’s 
Pacific Century” was published in Foreign Policy, the concept of a pivot to Asia has become 
quite common in the discussions of political elites in the United States and the rest of the 
world.87 Ms. Clinton stated, “Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics, [and] it 
boasts almost half of the world’s population. It includes many of the key engines of the global 
economy.”88 A simple definition of the pivot to Asia has been described by M. Schiavenza in 
The Atlantic: “The pivot is meant to be a strategic rebalancing of US interests from Europe 
and the Middle East toward East Asia.”89 The subhead of the article has a clear message: “The 
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future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will 
be right at the center of the action.”90 
No doubt the pivot to Asia is an important factor that reduces the significance of the 
Arabian Gulf to the United States, both by itself and as related to the shale revolution, which 
gives US the chance to look for their interests elsewhere, in this case in East Asia. 
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Chapter 2: The Importance of the Region in Security Dimension 
 
2.1 Energy Security and International Trading  
Three of the world’s top ten producers of oil are located on the Arabian Peninsula: 
Saudi Arabia (ranked first), the United Arab Emirates (UAE; seventh), and Kuwait (ninth). 
According to reserves data from the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) and country 
rankings from the Central Intelligence Agency, as of May 2013, Saudi Arabia had the largest 
proven oil reserves of any country in the world, with 267.91 billion barrels, or 18.17% of the 
world’s total. Kuwait (104 billion barrels) and the UAE (97.8 billion barrels) followed with 
the sixth- and seventh-largest proven reserves, comprising 7.05% and 6.63% of the world’s 
total, respectively. Iran has 154.58 billion (10.48%), and Iraq has 141.35 billion (9.59%).The 
region also has key natural gas producers, namely Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The British 
Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of Energy for 2012 estimated that the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states hold 20.4% of the world’s gas reserves, compared with 15.9% for Iran 
and 1.7% for Iraq. Some estimate that the GCC also has 17% of the world’s conventional gas 
reserves. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have the world’s third- and fourth-largest gas reserves, with 
about 12–13% and 3.94% of the world’s total, respectively. Saudi Arabia also has extensive 
mineral resources.91 
The Gulf is located in the center of the old world, and it connects the three continents 
of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Roughly 35% of all oil is transported via ocean, and 20% of all 
internationally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, some 17 million barrels daily. 
According to the EIA, the Strait of Hormuz is by far the world’s most important chokepoint 
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for oil trade.92In addition, 3.8 million barrels of oil pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait per 
day.93More than 20,000 ships pass through every year, and just the goods going to and 
coming from Europe were estimated to be worth $952 billion in 2009.94The trade that passes 
through the Suez Canal represents 11% of global sea trade flow.95 
 
2.2 The Importance of the Sunni-Shiite Relations and Five Issues of the Rivalry 
 
Islam is the second most common religion in the world, and accounts show that 1.6 
billion persons are following its rules; 90% of them are Sunni, and the rest are Shiite.96Sunnis 
and Shias exist in almost all countries in the world, either as citizens or immigrants. 
Therefore, any rift or rise in tension between Sunnis and Shias will affect global peace and 
stability.97 In the modern era, the Sunni–Shia disparity is shaped by the Saudi–Iranian rivalry. 
As the sovereign power over Mecca and Medina, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia claims special 
status as a protector of Islam. But Shiite Iran is competing with it for leadership of the Muslim 
world. 
Iranian–Saudi relations involve a mixture of politics and religion, especially following 
the Iranian/Islamic Revolution with its extreme religious identity (Shia Ithna).98 There are five 
major issues or points to consider.The first is the point on sectarian religion, and the second is 
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related to competition for leadership in the Muslim world. The third issue is the relationship 
with the West, particularly with the United States, while the fourth is the oil within 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), by which I mean the policies on 
pricing and production quantities.The fifth is the Iranian nuclear program. In fact, the last 
issue is linked to the nature of developments related to the previous three issues, and usually if 
there is tension between the two countries on any issue, it will quickly cast a shadow on the 
file of oil and the first point.99 
 
2.2.1 Sectarian Religion 
There have been a range of developments, such as war between Iran and Iraq; the 
situation of Shias in the region, beginning with Lebanon and Iran’s support for Hezbollah; the 
religious and political intervention in Iraq after 2003; and the Iranian role in the development 
movements in Bahrain and Syria in the context of the Arab Spring. Historically, the sectarian 
tension has its roots dating back to the criticism exchanged between Shias and the Wahhabi 
movement, which is not far from the political differences between the two countries in the 
competition to lead the Muslim world.100The leading of Islamic world is important because of 
its political, economic and influential benefits, the modern tension between Sunnis and Shias 
is reminiscent of a similar story of the competition between the Safavids and the Ottoman 
Empire.101 The Safavids forced the people in Persia to convert to Shiism to ensure their 
loyalty, and they raised a sectarian dimension against the Ottoman Empire. Iran is doing the 
same; therefore, we can understand the Sunni–Shia tension as a political tool rather than a 
cause for competition. The evidence is that, throughout most eras of Islam, Shias and Sunnis 
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have lived together in peace unless politicians have made it otherwise.102 Even in the same 
family, there can be both Sunni and Shia brothers. A good example of how Iran cares about 
political interests more than ideology is the cooperation between Al-Qaeda and Iran against 
the United States and Saudi Arabia despite their differences in ideology.103 Sectarian tension 
also diminished significantly during Khatami’s era because politicians willed it so.104 
 
2.2.2 Muslim World Leadership  
The second issue of the competition to lead the Islamic world is a contest of almost 
pure political interest; each party desires to be the leader because it will benefit politically, 
economically, and culturally. Saudi Arabia has the two most holy mosques; therefore, it is the 
most religious among the Islamic countries.105 Although Iran heavily advertises Qom City as 
a holy city for Shiism,106 the two most holy Shia sites—Karbala and Najaf—are located in 
Iraq, not in Iran.107 This may partially explain the Iranian keenness to intervene in Iraq to gain 
more influence over the original holy cities for Shias.108 
 
2.2.3 Relations with the West 
As previously mentioned, relations with the West are one of the major issues of 
competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as Iran desires to be recognized as a power in the 
Middle East by the great powers. It lost the position it held during the shah’s era after the 
1979 Revolution and the unacceptable behavior of the Iranian government, such as the 
American hostage crisis, Iranian assassination operations in Europe, and attacks of oil tankers 
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in the Gulf.109 Iran felt it was obvious that the international community supported the GCC, 
especially Saudi Arabia, to be the power in the region. 
 
2.2.4 The Competition in OPEC  
The fourth point is OPEC leadership and the policies regarding oil price and quantity. 
Saudi Arabia is the leader of OPEC, the most influential member, and the biggest producer; 
therefore, there is another issue of competition in the organization.110 Saudi Arabia tends to 
adopt moderate policies that serve oil producers and consumers,111 whereas Iran has a 
hawkish view and is looking for high prices because its production is small compared to Saudi 
Arabia’s.112 Saudi Arabia produces nine to ten million barrels per day, whereas Iran produces 
about three million;113 therefore, any drop in prices will affect the Iranian budget, and Iran 
needs currently to raise prices to about $130 a barrel to balance its budget.114 
 
2.2.5 Iran’s Nuclear Program 
The fifth issue is the nuclear file, which is very important for all parties in the region 
and internationally. Saudi Arabia believes that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons with the belief 
that this approach will provide invulnerability and the privilege of augmenting its leverage in 
the global political system.115 In addition, some states, such as Iran, do not have the ability to 
compete through the conventional power race. 
Nuclear deterrence is different from the conventional military race because in the 
nuclear race the price any country will pay if it tries to attack a competitor that also has 
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nuclear arms is higher than any state can tolerate; therefore, the balance line is fixed. In a 
conventional power race, the line is relative and not absolute; it moves according to changes 
in the power abilities of the states.116 Hence, even limited nuclear military power would 
provide a state with deterrence against big nuclear powers and nonnuclear powers.117 The 
Gulf States are worried about the possibility that Iran will possess nuclear arms, which will 
give Iran more influence in the region and decrease the ability of the international powers to 
contain the Iranian threat to the Saudi Arabia.118 Therefore, the most important principles for 
Saudis regarding the P5+1 to meet their expectations and to be satisfactory are that the system 
of surveillance on the Iranian nuclear program should be very restrictive, without any gap that 
would give Iran the capability to produce nuclear bombs, and that there should not be 
concessions at the expense of the interest of the Gulf states.119 Although the GCC, mainly 
Saudi Arabia has made it clear that the states of the region have the right to utilize nuclear 
power but for peaceful purposes only.120 Finally, the frozen Iranian assets that will be relieved 
(more than $100 billion) should not be used to destabilize the region.121 
The Iranian nuclear program as I mentioned is not only regional concern but it is an 
important international issue, which is why all the world powers (including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) plus Germany are deeply involved in this 
issue. They made the group called P5+1 to negotiate with Iran to ensure the peaceful purposes 
of its program and to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.122The agreement between 
the P5+1 and Iran, which was reached after marathon rounds of negotiations, includes many 
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detailed conditions that restrict Iran from getting nuclear weapons. The summary of the 
agreements indicates several conditions, including the following: 
(a) Iran must reduce its enriched uranium from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, and future 
Iranian uranium enrichment will be restricted to only 3.67% for fifteen years, which is 
enough to serve medical and electrical purposes. 
(b) More than two-thirds of Iranian centrifuge machines must be stored, and 
Iran is allowed to use only 5,060 centrifuges out of the 19,000 it has now. In addition, 
only IR-1 centrifuges can be used and only in one place, the Natanz plant. This 
condition will continue for ten years. 
(c) Iran must modify the Arak heavy water reactor to make it unable to 
produce platinum, which could be used for nuclear weapons. Also, Iran is prohibited 
from building any new heavy water plants for fifteen years. It must also implement an 
additional protocol agreement, which will continue in perpetuity for as long as Iran 
remains a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 
(d) Iran must sign the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and must stay a member of the NPT.  
(e) The IAEA will have comprehensive surveillance of Iranian nuclear 
facilities and activities. 
(f) Iran must stop uranium enrichment in Fordow for fifteen years. 
In return, Iran will gain the following: 
(g) UN and European sanctions related to Iran nuclear activities will be 
relieved as soon as the IAEA gives the green light for the agreement’s 
implementation. US sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program will also be relieved. 
It is estimated that more than $100 billion will be made available to Iran from its 
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frozen assets. Weapons sales sanctions will be relieved after five years, while the 
missiles sanctions will terminate after eight years.123 
If we wish to discuss the Iranian nuclear program we should review the history of 
Iranian program but I wrote the section retrospectively, due to the importance of recent 
developments of the Iranian nuclear program and the agreement between P5+1 and Iran   The 
Iranian nuclear program began in the 1950s; Iranian nuclear activities started on a small scale 
until the country received help from the United States, which in 1967 supplied Iran with a 
small 5MWt research reactor that used highly enriched uranium. The shah of Iran had big 
ambitions for nuclear power and was planning to have 23 Gigawatt electricity (GWE) by the 
2000s; therefore, he formed a new organization to handle Iranian nuclear activities, called the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. However, the Iranian Revolution, the isolation of Iran 
from the international community, and the Iraq–Iran War caused the nuclear program to slow 
down significantly. In the 1990s, the nuclear momentum was again accelerated by the Iranian 
regime, especially because it had more resources to spend after the end of the Iraq–Iran War. 
Iran sought help from Pakistan and China, and they signed cooperation agreements in 1987 
and 1990, respectively. Russia also entered online and built the Bushire reactor.124 
International suspicion about the nature of the Iranian nuclear program forced Iran to 
negotiate with the EU-3 (UK, France, and Germany) before referral to the UN Security 
Council. Iran agreed in 2003 to cooperate with the IAEA and to sign an additional protocol, 
but Iran continued to produce and use centrifuges to enrich uranium. Despite the Paris 
Agreement in 2004 and the promises to temporarily suspend sensitive nuclear activities, Iran 
continued to stock enriched uranium and centrifuges; therefore, it was placed under many 
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sanctions for its nuclear activities by the UN, the United States, and the European Union until 
Iran and the international community reached an agreement in 2015.125 
 
2.3 The War on Terror and Iran’s Relation to Terrorist Organizations 
The region contains the bases of many terrorist organizations that are threatening 
world security and peace, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; the Houthis group in 
Yemen; Daesh in Iraq and Syria; and Hezbollah in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Therefore, the 
stability of the region is an important factor in the war on terror.126 
The relationship between Iran and terrorist organizations has a long, documented 
history and includes groups such as Hezbollah and Palestinian militant groups. It also includes 
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), both of which are proud of their ties to Iran. 
For instance, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah considers himself a soldier of the Wilayat al 
Faqih (supreme leader of Iran).127 
Iran is considered by many high-ranking officials in the US administration to be one of 
the biggest sponsors of terrorism in the world, mainly against US interests, and the evidence is 
“overwhelming,” as described by Michael McConnell, the director of US national 
intelligence. Iran has even been labelled as a “central bank” of terrorism because of its 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.128 
The cooperation between Iran and Al-Qaeda may look odd at first glance because of 
their different ideologies (extreme Shiism versus extreme Sunnism), but they worked out a 
way to put their differences aside, at least temporarily, to collaborate against the United 
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States, using the proverb, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” About 20 members of 
Osama bin Laden’s family lived in Iran, and high-ranking Al-Qaeda members moved freely 
through Iran with the knowledge of Iran’s authorities after US invasion of Afghanistan.129In 
fact, Al-Qaeda in Iraq after the US’s invasion received huge support from the Iranian Ministry 
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) for attacking US and Iraqi targets, according to the US 
Department of the Treasury.130 
The report of the US Department of State on terrorism in 2010 mentioned clearly that 
“Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s financial, material, and 
logistic support for terrorist and militant groups throughout the Middle East and Central Asia 
had a direct impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in 
the Gulf, and undermined the growth and democracy.”131 
To discuss the long history of the relations between Iranian regime and terrorist 
activities we should go back to the era of eighties, which is after 1979 revolution, Iran had a 
prominent role in establishing Hezbollah in the 1980s, and the majority of the organization’s 
budget and weapons were provided by Iran. In return, Iran was given full control of 
Hezbollah’s political and military decisions.132 
Iran has been linked to many terrorist attacks since the 1980s. Famously, a US 
Marines compound in Lebanon was attacked, which caused the death of 243 US Marines, 
making it the largest terrorist attack in the history of the United States in the twentieth 
century. In addition, French facilities in Lebanon were attacked, which resulted in 58 deaths. 
The United States accused Iran and Hezbollah of these attacks despite the fact that other 
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terrorist groups claimed responsibility.133 Still, an Iranian official admitted that Iran helped 
the terrorist group, and Revolutionary Guard Commander Mohsen Rafiqdoust said, “Of 
course we helped. We don’t know if our equipment was used in this operation. A foreign 
Army occupied Lebanon. So it was right to hit back with martyrs.”134 
On April 18, 1983, in Lebanon, an attack by a car loaded with explosives in front of 
the US Embassy in Beirut killed 36 US Embassy employees. On October 23 of the same year, 
another huge attack on Marine facilities killed 241 and wounded 81.135 On December 12 of 
the same year, in Kuwait, al-Dawa Shia terrorists who had connections with Iran initiated a 
suicidal bombing attack against the United States, the French Embassy, US Raytheon 
employees, and the international airport; they also tried to assassinate Prince Jaber Al-Sabah 
(the prince of Kuwait), causing six deaths and wounding 80. The man behind these attacks 
was Imad Mughniyah, a high-ranking operative in Hezbollah.136 
Hezbollah has a long history of hijacking airplanes, such as Kuwaiti Airlines Flight 
221, onboard which two Americans were killed. Also, Hezbollah hijacked TWA Flight 847 
and killed one American onboard. Hezbollah practices all types of terrorist attacks, and it is 
well known for hostage kidnappings, specifically during the period of the 1980s, when it 
started kidnapping Westerners, some of whom died under torture.137 
Not only US and western governments were complaining of Iranian terrorist activities 
but Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of supporting terrorism in the Middle East, such as the Al-
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Khobar Towers bombing, which caused high casualties among Americans in Saudi Arabia.138 
Also, Iran has been accused of creating camps in Lebanese and Iranian lands to train terrorists 
to wage deadly attacks in Bahrain and the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia.139In addition, 
there is a public connection between the Iranian regime and the Houthi group in Yemen, 
which attacked Saudi Arabia’s southern border in 2009. Then, in 2015, Houthi toppled the 
legitimate government and seized power in Yemen, which led to the start of the military 
operation Decisive Storm, mainly by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to reinstate the legitimate 
president and government.140Iran has even helped Al-Qaeda members logistically, as Saif al-
Adel (a senior Al-Qaeda operative) was working freely from his Iranian base to arrange 
terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2003.141 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Research Question 
Did Arab uprising events and the retreating of the United States from the region (due 
to shale oil revolution and pivot to Asia) alter the balance of power between the GCC (mainly 
Saudi Arabia) and Iran, which forced Saudi Arabia to adopt a more assertive neorealist 
doctrine? 
To answer this question, I used combined qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, including both a literature review and interviews with experts in the field. I assumed 
that the withdrawal of the United States from the region and the developments of the Arab 
Spring did affect the balance of power in the Arabian Gulf, which has forced the GCC, 
especially Saudi Arabia, to shift to a more assertive neorealist doctrine to regain the status 
quo. 
The Gulf states have shown discomfort about US officials’ new concerns, which focus 
on Asian issues, putting the Gulf and Middle Eastern problems in a less important position on 
their agendas, which in turn gives Iran a wider field for maneuvering to get more influence in 
the region.142Similarly, Gulf elites are now worried about the implications of the rapid, 
unexpected US withdrawal from Iraq, keeping the place vacant for Iran, and the extensive US 
desire for rapprochement with Iran regarding Iraq’s future and the nuclear file.143Furthermore, 
US rejection of the call to interfere in Syria has made the Gulf worried about the United 
States’ future commitments to the region.144What has made the matter worse is the huge 
difference between most of the GCC and the United States in terms of their position toward 
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the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).145The GCC started doubting US policy in the region, and on 
several occasions it took the opposite position to US policy, sometimes even trying to 
undermine it.146Despite the rejection of some US officials that the idea is to retreat or 
withdraw from the Gulf region, the people of the Gulf region consider the nonengagement of 
the United States in the crises of the region as active withdrawal. 
 
3.2 Neorealism Theory 
Most well-known scholars in international relations who are interested in Middle 
Eastern regional politics believe that the region represents a good example of neorealist 
theory and that to understand the situation in the region we should refer to neorealist 
explanations.147Therefore, we should address neorealism, or structural realism, a theory of 
international relations created by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 work Theory of International 
Politics.148 It has become one of most dominant theories in international politics. But first, we 
should examine the history of realism and neorealism. The modern school of realism in 
international relations started in the first half of the twentieth century; Hans Morgenthau, who 
started to put realism in an academic frame, established six principles of realism: 
1. World politics are defined and organized by laws. These laws are connected 
to human nature, which is the main root of politics and states’ behavior.  Also these 
laws can be used to establish a theory that explains state and society policies. Realists 
like Morgenthau believe that human nature is the cause of all disputes and conflict 
globally. Human nature can be explained by two elements: human egoism, which may 
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lead to competition for resources to ensure survival, and human desire for power, or 
human beings’ wish to be above other people. Human selfishness is one example. 
2. In realism, the interest has significance, and the concept of interest is 
defined in terms of power. Power is the main interest of politics and is infused in 
rational order; therefore, realism is unemotional and objective. 
3. Despite power, the term realism is objective, and it can be generalized, but it 
is not fixed.  
4. Realism is fully aware of the difference between moral values and real 
politics and the conflict that may occur between them.  
5. Realism rejects the concept that moral values are at the core of policy 
making, and social morals at the interstate level can’t be practiced at all times at the 
international level. 
6. There is a huge difference between realism and other political schools 
regarding many issues, such as thoughts and norms.149 
Realism underwent a lot of researches and analyses in the international relations field 
until the late 1970s, when neorealism emerged. Then, Kenneth Waltz introduced neorealism, 
describing it simply: “Neorealism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined 
by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the 
number of great powers within the international system).”150In this way, Waltz started an 
innovative revolution in realism. He believed the international system has three tiers: the 
ordering principle of the structure, the differentiation of actors in the system, and the 
distribution of capabilities among those actors.151 
There are many differences between classical realism and neorealism: 
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a. The cause of conflict in the world is considered human nature in classical 
realism but the anarchic system in neorealism. Waltz came up with this concept for the 
structure of the system, which is an important element of his theory that makes it 
unique from others. 
b. As for the causality of international politics and what leads to the outcomes 
at the international system, realism proposes state interactions, while neorealism 
identifies two dimensions: the state as actor and the structure of the system.  
c. The primary actor, which is the state, is higher than the system in realism, 
whereas for neorealism it is below the system. 
d. Regarding the unit (state), realism believes it responds to the general 
condition of anarchy according to the characteristics of each state, while neorealism 
sees anarchy as the structure of the system and believes all units are the same but that 
their interaction depends on their capabilities.  
e. Realism posits that scarce resources lead to a power struggle among 
competitors, which is linked to human nature; neorealism thinks power is a means, not 
an end (combined capabilities of the state). 
f. Realism distinguishes status quo powers from revisionist powers, whereas 
neorealism considers states as the acting powers of the system, which are the same 
except for their capabilities.  
g. Neorealism takes a more scientific approach in explaining a state’s behavior 
in the international system.152 
Kenneth Waltz, as a neorealist, criticized classical realist theory on three points. First, 
realism depends on human nature as the root of politics, which means that it is difficult to test 
it empirically; therefore, no one can validate the theory. Second, human nature can’t explain 
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variations or contrary statues such as war and peace in the same way, for example. Third, 
Waltz accused realists of reductionism; they try to explain everything by the sum of the parts, 
whereas we cannot, how to explain that there can be a trend in international politics while the 
actors change over time.153 
What distinguished Waltz’s theory from others is the concept of “the anarchic 
system.” The international system is the power that draws the behavior of the states (unit 
actors), which accordingly affects their reactions to and relations with other states, instead of 
making the state domestic factors the source of policy making for state behavior in 
international politics. Although neorealists look to states as the primary actors, they are still 
under the influence of the international political system; naturally, each state has its own 
interests, which are sometimes inconsistent with other states, which thus may lead to military 
conflicts. In this anarchic system there is no higher authority that can rearrange the 
overlapping interests among the countries or forces of a peace state globally; therefore, each 
state tries to depend on itself and improve its capabilities to get good results in possible future 
disputes and to ensure its survival.154 
 
3.3 Main Features of Neorealism 
 
3.3.1 The System  
The system is the predominant power that forces all actors (states) to respond and form 
their international behavior based on the system’s pressure as it applies to them. Neorealists 
don’t totally deny the effect of domestic factors on the particular foreign policy of a state, but 
they don’t take this into account when explaining international politics; rather, they hold more 
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general views to explain the international relationships that depend mainly on the 
international anarchic system, and therefore, domestic factors don’t have much influence. 
Furthermore, Kenneth Waltz adopted a scientific method for the system that could be 
relatively measured and intentionally ignored immeasurable variations such as state domestic 
factors. Waltz made it clear that neorealism doesn’t predict foreign policy, but it can explain 
international politics. Even his book’s title (Theory of International Politics) explains the 
behavior of the states in the system. In neorealism, there is one independent variable, which is 
the system and the distribution of power within it to measure the number of polarities (great 
powers). That may lead to creating a balance of power, with the actors inside the system 
imitating each other’s advantageous methods.155 
 
3.3.2 Primary Actors  
The state is a unit actor in the system. The primary goal of a state in neorealism is 
survival,156 and states will do all they need to do to reach this goal. Accordingly, they create 
policies and take actions to reach this objective. There is no trust between states regarding 
security and power issues; therefore, each state assumes that the surrounding world has 
unpleasant intentions for either the present or the future157 
There are many definitions of a state among realists. Morgenthou stated, “A nation 
pursues foreign policy as a legal organization called a state, whose agents act as 
representatives of the nation in international affairs. They speak for it, negotiate treaties in its 
name, define its objectives, choose the means for achieving them, and try to maintain, 
increase, and demonstrate its power.”158 Stephen Kranser defined it as a “set of roles and 
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institutions [that] have peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of their own that are separate 
and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group. These goals relate to general 
material objectives or ambitious ideological goals related to beliefs about the ordering of 
society.”159 
A state should look to adversaries’ capabilities because distrust is dominant between 
states. If a state falls behind in its capabilities, these will cost it greatly, even maybe its 
existence.  
 
3.3.3 Anarchy  
In the international system there is no higher power that is dominant and legitimate 
enough to enforce rules among the states, and the internal policy rules and morals within  
states can’t be applied to the global system. Therefore, the meaning of anarchy in the 
international realm is distinguished by the lack of a central authority.160Each state believes 
itself to be the highest authority. Because of a lack of central authority and the weakness and 
ineffectiveness of international institutes such as the UN, each country has to provide for its 
own interests and survival. The structure of the international system restricts cooperation 
between the actors in two ways, as “each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in 
forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others.”161     
Not to mention the UN and other international institutes are not having a problem of 
inefficiency but also do not have enough power or laws to organize the international 
system.162 
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3.3.4 Self-Help 
There is no world-wide police in the international system; accordingly, each state is 
responsible for its own safety, integrity, and sovereignty, and its major duty is to use all 
means to help itself.163 In the international system this means that when one state is exposed 
to aggression, it should take care of itself, and nobody else should help it. But some realists, 
such as Glaser, suggest cooperation as a means of self-help, which seems odd to offensive 
realists, who believe the cooperation is a bad idea.164 
 
 3.3.5 Security Dilemma  
Neorealists believe the survival of a state is the primary goal, as mentioned before; 
therefore, states consider it their duty to expand their capabilities and power to counteract 
other competing powers. On the other hand, rival states will pursue the same behavior by 
maximizing their capabilities to protect their interests and engage in competition.165 Distrust is 
dominant between the states in this anarchic system, which leads to a kind of security 
dilemma. Therefore, it is a continuous process and the duty of states to enhance their survival 
and augment their security, which will lead to their being more suspicious of other competing 
states.166 Therefore “measures that enhance one state’s security typically diminish that of 
others.”167 Thus, neorealists believe that the interaction of a state with other international 
systems is mainly based on security apprehension.168 
 
3.3.6 Polarity of the System  
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I previously mentioned the distribution of capabilities and referred to the importance 
of great powers in the system. This leads us to the polarity of the system, which refers to the 
number of great powers that dominate it. If there is one great power, it is a unipolar system. If 
there are two great powers, it is a bipolar system. If there are more than two powers, it is a 
multipolar system. The most stable system is the bipolar one because it depends on an internal 
balance only; thus, there is no miscalculation and there is less conflict. On the other hand, a 
multipolar system can involve external balance and alliances, which make for a less stable 
system.169 
 
3.4 Balance of Power 
 
3.4.1 The Definition of Balance of Power 
The definition of balance of power is very controversial issue, and it has several 
definitions but it can be defined simply as a state of equilibrium in which no one state or 
alliance is dominant. There are three types: first, the balance of power as a situation; second, 
the balance of power as a policy; and third, the balance of power as a system.170 Balance of 
power through policy means a state works actively to reach equilibrium. As a situation, it is 
equilibrium between the actors in the system. As a system, it refers to a particular 
understanding of the international relations process in the world.171 
Normally states do not like hegemony; therefore, they try to counteract it, which 
means they try to prevent an actor or group of actors from concentrating capabilities such as 
material resources or their use to gain political advantage.172 The balance of power concept is 
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popular among politicians as well as many academic scholars. Former US President Richard 
Nixon stated, “We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had 
any extended periods of peace is when there has been balance of power ... I think it will be a 
safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet 
Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even 
balance.”173 
 
3.4.2 The Deterrence 
If we discuss the balance of power we should also discuss the deterrence for many 
reasons, such as the fact that the deterrence goes back to the historical root of realism and 
neorealism. Additionally, the deterrence, balance of power and neorealism are connected in 
the thoughts of international relations scholars174. Also, in our case in the rivalry between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, the deterrence is a very important concept, as I will discuss later. And 
to get to know more on subject, I will start with a simple definition of deterrence,which “is 
the manipulation of an adversary’s estimation of the cost–benefit calculation of taking a given 
action. By reducing prospective benefits or increasing prospective costs (or both), one can 
convince the adversary to avoid taking an action. ”175 The neorealists see the balance of 
power as the most effective way to keep the order in the international system which is 
required as long as the power equally distributed among the actor, it will keep peace status, 
therefore it is the equation of profit, cost and loss which will determine the deterrence. John 
Mearshmier put it as ``power inequalities invite war by increasing the potential for successful 
aggression; hence war is minimized when inequalities are least.''176 
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  There are two types of deterrence, first direct deterrence which is preventing armed 
attack on the state territory. Second, extended deterrence which prevent armed attack on another 
state territories. 177 
It is important for discussing the concept of balancer of power to mention the two 
major elements of the balance of power: internal balance and external balance. 
 
3.4.3Internal Balance  
Internal balance depends on self-force factors and internal capabilities, such as gross 
domestic product (GDP), population, land, natural resources, military power, economic 
strength, competence, and political stability. The existence of strong internal balance factors 
such as these enables a state to defend its interest in the anarchic system.178 
 
3.4.4External Balance 
External power depends on external alliances. It includes the ability to partner with 
other states and cooperate with them against common threats.179 It involves attracting other 
state actors in the system to form an axis, either by diplomacy or economic interests, to 
counteract a common danger, which is usually another state or group of states in the system. 
Credibility and diplomacy are important tools of soft power in external balance, along with 
how the other actors in the system look at a state. This has a clear effect in the Iranian case, as 
the United States and Europe view Iran suspiciously because of its behavior and support of 
terrorism and the instability in the Middle East, which was the second reason they tended to 
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the GCC,180 the first being economic interest between the GCC and the international 
community. 
There are many options for balancing power, either by depending on domestic 
capabilities or facing threats or alliances with external powers. In the balance of power 
associated with external power, there are four states: 
1. There is no need to ally with external powers; therefore, the state depends on its 
internal balance against other states.  
2. Small states come together to balance big states. 
3. Big state allies with small state against other big states.  
4. A small state jumps on a bandwagon with a bigger state. 
States prefer the first option and find the last one the least appealing.181 
 
3.4.5 Strategies for Balance of Power 
There are many techniques or strategies to keep the balance in the system, but two relate most 
to the subject of this study. The first is passing thebuck, which is when a state gives the 
mission of the balance of power and protection of security to other states to avoid the duty of 
containing a threat.182 In the present case, the balance of power and status quo are in favor of 
the GCC because the United States is on its side. It is worth mentioning that the United States 
has willingly taken on this mission for decades to protect its interests in the region, which are 
mainly those of the international energy supply.183 
The second is chain ganging, which is when a group of states gathers to form an 
alliance against a particular threat.184 This is one of the main policies of the GCC in 
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confronting Iran; one of the main reasons behind the creation of the GCC was to counter the 
Iranian menace and its influence on the Gulf States.185 
The existence of strong internal balance factors, such as military strength and a strong 
economy, enables states to defend their interests in the anarchic system, but it is important for 
states to have both the capabilities of power and the strategy for how to use it in a proper way 
to obtain preferable results.186 
When facing an external threat, a state has three strategies of internal balance from 
which to select, according its circumstances: It can continue in the same way, with no change 
in the elements of internal balance, such as military power, resources, or policies; it can adopt 
an innovation, a “conscious, purposeful effort by one state to offset the perceived relative 
power advantage of another state by the creation of entirely new institutions, technologies, or 
governing practices;”187 or it can emulate the “conscious, purposeful imitation, in full or in 
part, by one state of any institution, technology, or governing practice of another state.”188 
 
3.4.6Major Schools of Neorealism  
There are two major scholarly lines in neorealism. The first is defensive neorealism, in 
which a state’s goal is to keep its position in the system stable—in a survival position, in other 
words—and it will not risk more power and hegemony, which could cause a security threat. 
This is Waltz’s school of survival.189 
The second trend is offensive realism, in which a state makes it its goal to increase its 
influence in the system, even at the expense of other states. Here the state is looking for 
hegemony on the grounds that the augmentation of power will lead to survival. Therefore, 
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power is the ultimate end of the people who support this trend, such as 
Mearsheimer.190Therefore, the discussion between neorealists regarding a state’s behavior in 
the system is how to classify the state, as either security oriented or power oriented.191 
 
3.4.7 Other Independent Variables for Measuring Power Changes 
We mentioned before in this chapter that neorealism doesn’t account the domestic 
factor variables because it is unmeasurable, and this is one of important principles of the 
neorealism and as we put neorealism the main core theory in this research therefore we should 
stick to the rules, by not including unmeasurable domestic variable, that being said, we added 
two independent variables that are measurable numerically, to see the alteration of power and 
the effect of major changes in the Middle East such Arab Uprisings and US withdrawal on 
internal balance of Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as these two variables we selected are 
reflecting many of Kenneth Waltz’s elements of power such as economic capabilities and 
political stability and competence. These independent variables are the Human Development 
Index (HDI) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and both are well recognized 
internationally and created by independent institutes, UN and World Bank respectively. The 
HDI focuses on three basic areas: a healthy and long life, such as indicated by life expectancy 
at birth; the standard of living, such as indicated by gross national income per capita; and 
knowledge, such as indicated by mean years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and 
expected years of schooling for children of school-entering age.192While WGI focuses on 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, voice and accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption.193 
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Chapter 4: The application of the framework in the region 
 
4.1 Neorealism perspective among the Competitors in the Region 
According to the neorealist framework in the case of the Saudi Arabia–Iran rivalry, 
both are competing to lead the Islamic world and both have religious influences, so they are 
trying to augment their hegemony in the region.194 Historically, Iran and Saudi Arabia have 
felt distrust toward each other. Iran (historically the Safavid Empire) showed hostility toward 
its Arab neighbors, including Iraq and the GCC.195 The tension increased following the 
revolution era when Khomeini demanded that the corrupt governments in the region be 
toppled, referring to Iraq and the GCC.196 Furthermore, geographical competition also occurs 
in the same region, such as is the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia,197 not to mention that the 
region has geographical importance for the rest of the world.198 Both countries have been 
affected by global politics and interact with the international political system according to 
their interests and capabilities, such as in the old case of the Cold War of the United States 
and the USSR, recently leadership over the oil supply,199 and policies toward recent events, 
like the Arab uprisings and the Iranian nuclear file. 
The concept of anarchy in the Iranian mentality is shown by two major events. The 
first was the invasion of Iraq by the United States without the UN’s permission, which 
suggested that there was no higher power that could force a superpower like the United States 
to follow international law.200 The second event was the international sanctions on the Iranian 
regime. Despite there being some UN resolutions to legalize those sanctions, Iran says they 
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are not fair, claiming that the sanctions were applied under the influence of the United States 
in the Security Council of the United Nations.201 
Regarding survival and security, both countries are looking to bolster their security. 
Almost always, the main determinants of their foreign policies are security and threats, and 
their international behavior is in response to a security equation; therefore, survival is the 
ultimate goal for both.202 On the issue of self-help, Iran has been acting to assert Iranian 
sovereignty and security against foreign challenges. Iran has been somewhat isolated from the 
international community because of the aggressive behavior of its regime and its support of 
terrorism globally.203 Therefore, Iran feels it has no real superpower alliances in the 
international community; even though it has good relations with Russia and China, neither 
would challenge the United States for Iran’s sake.204 As a result, Iranians depend on their 
internal capabilities and internal balance more than external balance. On the other hand, Saudi 
Arabia has good international connections and a good reputation, in addition to significant 
economic weight.205 Therefore, Saudis depend on both external and internal balance, and 
especially with the presence of the United States in the region, they have tended more toward 
external balance, at least in the last few decades. Therefore the balance of power for Saudi 
Arabia and Iran is a policy, both are actively seeking for it (the balance) and trying to shift in 
their favor. 
 It is worth mentioning that many scholars have discussed the competition of 
ideologies (Saudi Sunniism versus Iranian Shiism). Stephen Walt referred to the importance 
of ideology in the Middle East because it is used as an effective tool in disputation and the 
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balance of power.206 But the RAND study suggested that “sectarianism and ideology shape 
relations, but do not define them.”207 
 The apparent difference in the neorealist views of each country is that Saudi Arabia 
tends to engage in more defensive neorealism and is looking to keep the status quo for its 
advantage, while Iran prefers offensive neorealism and hegemony and wishes to change the 
status quo.208 
Saudi Arabia has the United States on its side, whereas Iran does not; therefore, Saudi 
Arabia has both internal and external balance in its favor in conventional power. Iran is trying 
to use many tools to implement unconventional strategies, including religion (Sunni–Shia 
tension), as was used before by the Safavids against the Ottoman Empire to keep the region 
busy with sectarian tension.209 
 It is important to mention that both countries have major differences that are playing 
an important role in their competition and policies: regime principles. Iran is an expansionist 
state, and this is clear and public; one of the roots of the Iran Revolution was the exportation 
of revolution to neighbor states. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has, as one of the principles 
of royal leadership, a noninterference policy in other states. This inconsistency in policies 
contributes to the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as the first wants to keep the 
status quo while the second wants to change it. 
We mentioned before that Iran has used unconventional strategy in their international 
politics which the sectarian issue, also Iran prefers the unconventional strategy in military 
policy, one of the main principles of Iranian military and foreign policy doctrine is 
asymmetric warfare210 for two important reasons: First, Iran can’t compete with the United 
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States or Saudi Arabia in conventional military power because both of them have more 
advanced military assets than Iran; second, Iran can’t access the international arms market 
because of sanctions.211 In addition, asymmetric warfare is cheaper than conventional warfare, 
which fits Iran’s low budget, and it doesn’t require high technology.212 
 
4.2 New Deterrencein the Region 
The GCC has used to apply the strategy of passing the buck to deal with Iran in last few 
decades, which gives the mission of Gulf security to US to protect the Gulf States and in same 
time US interests from the expansionist ambitions of Iran. US has taken this mission seriously 
and had a constant presence with their forces in the region for decades. US stressed that the 
protection of energy supply is vital for them and the world economy as we mentioned before. 
Therefore the extended deterrence was the dominant in the region which was provided by US 
as superpower and huge forces it has,although after the shale oil revolution which accelerated 
in 2008 and reach high amount of production after, the importance of region has been 
diminished in the eyes of US officials. 
The Gulf States wanted an active US presence in the area, and what the GCC means 
by this is practical, efficient intervention in the crisis. It is true that the United States has kept 
some of its forces in the region, but there are some signs of reduction. For example, the Gulf 
will be left without US aircraft carriers for first time in seven years (usually there have been 
two air carriers or at least one in the past years to deter Iran).213 US troops number in the 
region reduced significantly from its peak 2007 and 2008 which was above one hundred sixty 
thousands solders to about forty thousand currently although US withdrawal from Iraq 
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decreased the number but still it is major reduction, and it is seventy five percent less.214 Even 
though there are smaller US forces in the region, unless they are effective and are engaging 
energetically in the region’s crises, this is considered by the GCC as US withdrawing. 
Therefore the Saudis started looking for their own direct deterrence (huge surge in military 
spending), and with the rest of GCC and even adding more Arab states, they are trying to 
make new chain ganging that leads to new form of extended deterrence without US, in an 
attempt to compensate the US extended deterrence. 
 
4.3 The New Saudi Arabian Doctrine  
After the retreat of the United States from the region and secretive negotiations 
between the United States and Iran, Gulf politicians became so upset by US behavior that they 
publicly criticized the Obama Administration. For example, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former 
chief of Saudi intelligence told European diplomats that “the United States had failed to act 
effectively against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In addition, the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict was growing closer to Tehran, and the US had failed to back Saudi support for 
Bahrain when it crushed an anti-government revolt in 2011.”215Also in same context 
“The shift away from the US is a major one, the source close to Saudi policy said. Saudi 
doesn’t wish to find itself any longer in a situation where it is dependent,” Reuters said. 
With unusually blunt public remarks, Prince Turki al-Faisal called Obama’s policies in Syria 
lamentable and ridiculed a US–Russian deal to eliminate Assad’s chemical weapons. He 
suggested it was a ruse to let Obama avoid military action in Syria.216 The current charade of 
international control over Bashar’s chemical arsenal would be funny if it were not so blatantly 
perfidious and designed not only to give Mr. Obama an opportunity to back down (from 
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military strikes), but also to help Assad to butcher his people, said Prince Turki, a member of 
the Saudi royal family and former director of Saudi intelligence.217 
 
In the last two decades the Iranian nuclear file was one of the main concerns of the 
GCC, mainly Saudi Arabia, which augmented the tension between the two shores of the Gulf. 
Saudis think that Iran is aspiring to develop nuclear weapons to increase its influence in the 
region and to become the superpower of the Middle East. This is why Saudi Arabia considers 
an Iranian nuclear bomb to be an existential threat.218 
Saudi Arabia is very upset about Iranian influence in the region and attempts to 
become the Middle Eastern superpower. Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz, the 
Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom, told the Times of London, “We are not going to sit 
idly by and receive a threat there and not think seriously how we can best defend our country 
and our region.”219 From the speeches of many high-up Saudi officials, we can see that Saudi 
Arabia is moving toward a more assertive (offensive) neorealist doctrine of increasing 
security independence from the United States and augmenting self-help to improve its internal 
balance capabilities and reducing dependence on external balance powers in the Gulf. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Economic and Military Power of Saudi Arabia and Iran 
 
5.1 The Power and the Calculation of Balance of Power 
The definition of power in international relations is very controversial; it is not 
surprising, as Hans J. Morgenthau mentioned, that the concept of political power poses one of 
the most difficult and controversial problems of political science.220 It can be stated simply 
that power is the ability to influence or control the behavior of others.221 Kenneth Waltz 
briefly defined power in international relations in terms of the distribution of capabilities.222 
Morgenthau, in his effort to search for the most proper concept of national power, said, 
“Power may comprise anything which establishes and maintains the control of man over 
man…Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence 
to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.”223 This is a 
comprehensive definition that includes more indicators than economy, geography, and 
military capabilities, as other realist scholars have mentioned. 
Regarding type of power from a realist perspective, there are three types. The first is 
the ability to influence, which means the ability to get others to act in a manner that adds to 
the interests of the owner of the power. The second is the active participation in important 
decision making in the community. The third type involves people trying to combine the 
former two types, which means that the owner of the power directs a particular person or a 
particular group to raise particular political issues.224 
After the power has been defined, I should refer to the concept of balance of power, is 
not a rigid process but rather a changing and evolving one. The process involves dynamic 
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variables of related parties that work mutually to maintain positions and interests that reflect 
their capacities and capabilities and those of other states.225 It is also a process in which 
capacity changes continuously among parties seeking to restore the balance of power, and the 
concept of the balance of power is multidimensional in terms of capacity beyond the concept 
of military balance; therefore, the balance of power includes the addition of economic, 
human, and political dimensions of capacity.226 
Measurement of national power is another controversial issue among political 
scholars. According to Jeffery Hart, there are three approaches for measuring power in global 
politics: source control, actor control, and outcome and result control.227 
Throughout the history of political science, many definitions have been suggested to 
describe and to measure national power. For example, Karl Deutsch, Norman Alcock, and 
Alan Newcombe used military spending as a measurement of a state’s power, while Klaus 
Knorr used an economic parameter for power measurement, and still Hitch and McKean used 
a country’s total output.228 It is interesting to note that these former scholars used a single 
indicator to measure power, but Clifford German started to use a more comprehensive 
equation to measure national power, which is known as the world power index: 
G = national power = N (L + P + I + M) 
Where N is nuclear capability, L is land, P is population, I is the industrial base, and M is 
military size.229 
A popular multivariant equation for national power is Cline’s formula: 
National power = (C + E + M) (S + W) 
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Where C is critical mass (including population and territory), E is economic capacity, M is 
military capacity, S is the national strategy coefficient, and W is national will.230 
Additionally, Chin-Lung Chang described three models to measure power:  
Model 1: Power = Nations GNP / World Total x 200 
Model 2: Power = (Critical Mass+ Economic Strength + Military Strength) / 3 
Where Critical Mass = (Is Population / World Total) x 100 + (Is Area / World Total) x 100; 
Economic Strength = (Is GNP / World Total) x 200; and Military Strength = (Is ME / world 
total) x 200. 
Model 3: Power = Model 2 x (IS Energy / World Average) 
Where GNP = gross national product, Area = total area, ME = military spending, Energy = 
energy consumption per capita.231 
             In this study I have used Chang’s models to measure the national power of the Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and US because it is multivariate, comprehensive, numeric and easy to define.  
Therefore, Model 1 for Saudi Power = 1546 / 75590 x 200 = 4.090. 
 Model 1 for Iranian power = 1209 / 75590 x 200 = 3.198 
Model 2 for Saudi power = ((30 / 7000) x 100 + (2.149 / 510) x 100 + 4.090 + (80 / 
1756) x 200)) / 3 = 
 = (0.428 + 0.421+ 4.090 + 9.111) /3 = 4.683 
Model 2 for Iranian power = ((77.45 / 7000) x 100 + (1.648 /510) x 100 + 3.198 + (30 
/1756) x 200)) / 3= 
 (1.106 + 0.323 + 3.198 + 3.416) / 3 = 2.681 
Model 3 for Saudi power = 4.683 x (681/ 313) = 9.42 
While Model 3 for Iranian power = 2.681 x (305 / 313) = 2.61. 
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The gross national income of Saudi Arabia = $1,546 (World Bank 2013); area of 
Saudi Arabia = 2.149 million square kilometers (the World Fact Book); total area of Earth = 
510 km square; Saudi population = 30 million (Statista 2014); world population = 7000 
million (United Nations, World Population October 2011); military spending of Saudi Arabia 
= $80 billion USD ("Sipri Military Expenditure Database." Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (Sipri). 2015.), Total Military Spending 2015 Fact Sheet for 2014); world 
military expenditure = $1,756 billion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
2012); energy consumption per capita of Saudi Arabia = 681 watts per person (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2012); and energy consumption per capita average = 313 (CIA, US 
Department of Energy, and other sources 2014).  
The gross national income of Iran = $1,209 (World Bank 2013); area of Iran = 1.648 
million km square; population = 77.45 million (World Bank 2013); military spending of Iran 
= $30 billion USD (Obama’s interview, New York Times, Politifact, April 2015); and energy 
consumption per capita of Iran = 305 watts per person (CIA 2013). 
We have to add US measurements because they are the basis of the power in Gulf 
security and calculations of the balance of power in the region. Thus, for the United States:  
US Model 1 = (16990/75590) x 200 = 44.95 
US Model 2 = ((318.9 / 7000) x 100 + (9.857 / 510) x 100 + 44.95 + 610 /1756)x 200) 
/ 3= (4.55 + 1.93 + 44.95 + 69.47) / 3 = 40.3 
US Model 3 = 40.3 x (1683 / 303) = 223.84 
The US gross national income = $16,990 (World Bank 2013); area of the United 
States = 9.857 million km square; population of the United States = 318.9 million; military 
spending of the United States = 610 USD (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
Total Military Spending 2015 Fact Sheet for 2014); and energy consumption per capita = 
1683 watts per person (US Department of Energy 2014). 
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From the results above, we can see that there is no huge difference between the 
national powers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States before the Arab uprisings (2010) 
or after the Arab uprisings (2014), but there is a clear difference after US withdrawal from the 
region.  
Table 1.1. The powers in the region pre- & post-Arab uprisings in Model 1 & 2 
Country Model 1(2010) Model 1(2014) Model 2(2010) Model 2(2014) 
Saudi Arabia 4.01 4.09 3.57 4.68 
Iran 3.21 3.19 2.72 2.68 
US 48.7 44.95 47.14 40.3 
Source: Alshammary modified, according to Chang’s Models, GNI of Iran, IMF 
(2010); GNI Saudi & U.S., World Bank (2010); World Military Spending, International 
Peace Research Institute (Sipri) (2010). 
Table 1.2. The balance of the power in the region with and without the US 
Country Nation Power Model 
1 
Nation Power 
Model 2 
 
Nation Power Model 
3 
Saudi Arabia + US 4.09+44.95=49.04 4.68+40.3= 44.98 9.42+223.8=233.2 
Saudi Arabia after 
US withdrawal 
4.09 4.68 9.42 
Iran  3.19 2.68 2.61 
Source: Alshammary modified, according to Chang’s Models 
 All three models lead to the same result, which is that Saudi Arabia has more national 
power than Iran does. 
According to Morgenthau, military force is the most important material aspect of nation 
power, and according to RAND, the most important parameter for power is military 
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spending; therefore, we will compare the military spending of the military powers in the 
region.232 
 
Table 2.233 Annual military spending between 2006 and 2012 (Saudi Arabia versus Iran) 
Country/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Saudi Arabia 45.1 48.5 52.5 63 80 
Iran 27.2 26.3 23.9 unknown 30 
Notice: Numbers are in Billion U.S. dollar.  
Source: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf Military Balance: Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: CSIS, 
2013) and Sipri 2015, and Obama 2015. 
 
5.2 Economic and Competence Measures 
In his definition of power, Kenneth Waltz mentioned seven elements of power: “size 
of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence.”234 I will try to use objective measurements to represent 
each element. Therefore, I selected the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) and Human 
Development Index (HDI) because they are objective measurements from independent 
institutes such as the World Bank and UN respectively. In addition, both (WGIs & the HDI) 
reflect many elements of Waltz’s power elements. Specifically, the HDI reflects economic 
status and population, while WGIs reflect many economic capabilities, political stability, and 
competence. Furthermore, I added military forces data and military spending as the best 
indicators for military capabilities because military power is still the most important element 
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of a nation’s power, according to Rand, though it is worth mentioning that Waltz didn’t give 
specific percentages for each element. 
 
5.2.1 Human Development Index  
The HDI for Saudi Arabia according to HumanDevelopment Report(HDR) 2010 was 
0.752 while in HDR 2014 was 0.836 and, it occupied the thirty-fourth position globally(it was 
fifty-five in HDR 2010) with consideration, that HDR mainly estimates a year before. The 
HDI for Iran in HDR 2010was 0.702 ( ranking seventy globally)while in HDR 2014 Iran was 
0.749, ranking seventy-fifth among 187 countries in HDI classification.235 
 
5.2.2 Worldwide Governance Indicators  
 The WGIs measure six dimensions: political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, 
rule of law, and control of corruption. The indicators take into account several hundred 
individual underlying variables from a wide range of data sources. They contain the views of 
a large number of citizens and expert survey respondents worldwide.236 
 From the comparison of worldwide governance indicators we can see that Saudi 
Arabia in general has better indicator values than Iran for all World Bank indicators. For 
details of the comparison between Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding WGI, please see figures 3-
11. 
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Table 3. Comparing K. Waltz’s elements of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
between 2010-2014 
Country Population Territory GDP GDI (six 
indicators) 
HDI Military 
Spending 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Lower Bigger Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Iran  Higher Smaller Lower Lower Lower Lower 
Source: Alshammary modified,according to the information of World Bank, UN, IMF and 
"Sipri Military Expenditure Database." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri). 
2015. 
 
5.3Military Power of Saudi Arabia and Iran 
 
Table 4.1. Saudi Arabian basic military data 
Population 28.83 million 
Territory 2,149,690 km2 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 748.4 billion USD 
Source: World Bank 2013. 
Personnel, Army (Regular) 214500 
Number of Brigades 23 
Tanks 1120 
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)/ 
Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)  
4645 
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Artillery (Including Multiple Rocket 
Launchers [MRLs])  
900 
Combat Aircraft 340 
Transport Aircraft 62 
Helicopters 255 
Heavy SAM Batteries 21  
Medium SAM 21 
Navy & 
Combat Vessels 27 
Patrol Craft  68 
Source: Yiftah Shapir, “Military Balance Files, Saudi Arabia”, The Institute for 
National Security Studies, 2014). 
 
Table 4.2. Iranian basic military data 
Population 77.45 million 
Territory 1,648,372 km2 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 368.9 billion USD 
Source: World Bank 2013. 
Personnel, Army (Regular) 520000 
Number of Brigades 87 
Tanks 1620 
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)/ 
Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)  
1400 
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Artillery (Including Multiple Rocket 
Launchers [MRLs])  
3000 
Combat Aircraft 320 
Transport Aircraft 129 
Helicopters 570 
Heavy SAM Batteries 30 
Medium SAM 6 
Navy  
Combat Vessels 110 
Patrol Craft  150 
Submarines 18 
Source: Yiftah Shapir,“Military Balance Files, Iran”, The Institute for National 
Security Studies, 2013). 
 
For detailsof the military comparison between Saudi Arabia and Iran, please see tables 
5.1, 5.2 and figures 3-24. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis of External Power 
 
6.1 Recent Developments in the Region  
 Saudi Arabia and Iran entered a new stage following recent events in the Middle East, 
such as the Arab uprisings and US retreating from the region. The position of the Saudi 
Arabia and GCC in general on the Arab uprisings were inconsistent; it did not encourage them 
in Egypt and Tunisia,237 but it intervened militarily in Libya to topple Gaddafi’s regime.238 In 
addition, it played an important role in Yemen through what was called the GCC Initiative, 
which drew the transitional phase in Yemen.239 Finally, it was active in supporting the Syrian 
Revolution and the Free Syrian Army.240 At the same time, Iran reacted to the Arab uprisings 
according to its interests. 
I will start with Egypt is very important player in the region and has a strong army that 
is considered one of the five most powerful militaries in the Middle East.241 It was a very 
close ally to the Gulf States, but after the Egyptian uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
took over. Historically, the Egyptian MB has had good relations with Iran but not a lot of 
harmony with the GCC, which has disturbed the external balance of power.242 This may 
explain the active role of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the counterrevolution, 
which brought Egypt back to military rule,243 not to mention the mistakes the Muslim 
Brotherhood made during its rule, which made it unpopular among the Egyptian 
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population.244 Hence, the outcome of the two Egyptian uprisings was the restoration of the 
external balance of power in favor of the GCC.  
Another country that was hit by Arab uprisings was Libya. Gaddafi’s regime had bad 
relations with the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia, as it had tried to assassinate the previous 
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the collapse of the Gaddafi regime was a positive 
point for the GCC;245 two members of the GCC—the UAE and Qatar—played active roles in 
the military campaigns against Gaddafi’s forces.246 
In Syria, the confrontation between the GCC and Iran is very obvious and public.247 
The Syrian regime is considered one of the most important allies of Iran in the region, and 
there are military, intelligence, and logistical links between Iran and Hezbollah,248 a Lebanese 
organization under the control of the Iranian regime.249 After the Syrian uprisings, Iran tried 
extensively to support its ally, Assad’s regime, but the revolution was overwhelming. The 
GCC, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, supported the moderate opposition to the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) logistically, financially, and in the form of military aid. This became a 
proxy war between the GCC and Iran in Syria;250 Turkey also supported some groups of the 
Syrian opposition. The GCC and Turkey had different purposes for intervening in Syria: The 
Gulf was looking to counteract the Iranian influence in Syria, while Turkey, a neighbor of 
Syria, wished to increase its regional leverage in its own backyard.251 On the other hand, Iran 
sent troops and even ordered Hezbollah to interfere in the Syrian War. Iran also recruited 
many Shia organizations and groups from Iraq and Afghanistan to fight with Assad’s 
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regime,252 inviting extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda to become involved in this conflict by 
releasing several leaders from Syrian jails. This may have led the extremist groups to weaken 
the moderate opposition parties.253 But the outcome so far has been in favor of the opposition; 
Assad’s regime became weak, and Hezbollah suffered a large number of casualties.254 
Furthermore, Assad’s regime now controls only about a sixth of Syrian land.255 
In Iraq, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh, controls a large area of the 
country, as well as more than 30% of Syria.256 Daesh poses a threat to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
Daesh has weakened the Iraqi government, which was a good ally to Iran. Surprisingly, Daesh 
has not waged any direct attack on Iran, but it has claimed many attacks on Saudi mosques.257 
Hence, I consider Daesh negative for both the GCC and Iran.  
In Yemen, which is considered the backyard of Saudi Arabia, the GCC interfered 
through its initiative to shape the transitional political process in Yemen to remove ex-
President Saleh peacefully from his position and create a newly elected government. The 
intervention of Iran through the Houthis group with help from Saleh’s loyalists led to a 
military coup and the expulsion of the legitimate government. Then, the GCC interfered 
militarily (in OperationDecisive Storm), which I will discuss later in this chapter when I 
address the steps that were taken by the GCC to demonstrate a more assertive neorealist 
doctrine.258 
In general, if we calculate the final outcomes of the Arab uprisings in terms of the 
balance of power in the Gulf region, we find that the uprising in Egypt was positive for the 
GCC; the uprising in Libya—although it did not affect the balance impressively—was 
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positive for the GCC; and the uprising in Syria clearly benefitted the GCC by weakening 
Iran’s biggest ally in the region. In Iraq, the GCC has not benefited because Daesh is an 
enemy to both the Iraqi government and Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, the GCC has not benefited 
because the country is divided between the Houthis and the government in Aden, which is 
supported by the GCC. 259Therefore, the total result of the Arab uprisings is in favor of the 
GCC. But if we compare the balance of power before and after the Arab uprisings, we will 
notice that Egypt, for example, was an ally to the GCC, and so the Gulf simply restored its 
ally. Yemen was also an ally of the GCC, but the old regime and the Houthis became 
enemies; therefore, we can’t jump to the conclusion that the GCC has benefited from the Arab 
uprisings in terms of the balance of power until we see the final results in Syria, Yemen.  
Seeking objectivity to measure the balance of power and the value of each state in the 
balance of power, I selected military spending as the gauge. The average military spending 
for the sum of five Arab affected by uprisings states before the Arab Uprisings is 2126 
million $; therefore, the weight of each state is their own military spending on $2,126. While 
in the era of post- Arab Uprisings, the average of yearly military spending increased to 2619 
million $ in 2014. 
Table 6.1 External balance and allies of Gulf powers Pre-Arab Uprisings 
Country 
allies  
Tunisia Egypt Libya Yemen Syria Total 
Saudi Arabia 0.28+ 2.16+ 0.62- 0.81+ 1.11- 1.52+ 
Iran 0.28- 2.16- 0.62+ 0.81- 1.11+ 1.52- 
Table 6.2 External balance and allies of Gulf powers Post-Arab Uprisings 
Country 
Allies 
Tunisia  Egypt Libya Yemen Syria Total 
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Saudi Arabia 0 1.89+ 1.44+ 0 0 3+ 
Iran 0 1.89- 1.44- 0 0 3- 
Notice: (+) means an ally, (-) means non-ally and (0) means indeterminate.  
Source: Alshammary, modified from military spending, According to the information of Sipri. 
 
Another major development in the Gulf was the US withdrawal from the region. For 
decades, the United States was a major pillar of security in the Arabian Gulf, but US allies in 
the Gulf were uncomfortable with the ideas of some US politicians who said that the region 
did not hold as much importance to the US agenda as it had before. This gave Iran the chance 
to fill the United States’ void in the Middle East. As a result, the GCC tried to take a more 
active role in its own security efforts.260 Although some US officials deny military withdrawal 
from the region, the GCC viewed US disengagement in the region, mainly in the recent 
military conflicts, as withdrawing. Additionally, the United States has rejected invitations to 
participate in Syria in order to remove Assad’s regime, and in Yemen, the United States only 
provided minimal logistical support for the Arab coalition. 
In recent years, US oil production has increased significantly, which has reduced US 
dependence on the energy supply from the Middle East. The GCC found itself in a critical 
situation, as the power (i.e., the United States) that had been maintaining stability in the Gulf 
region for decades and acting as a counterbalance to Iran left after these changes in US 
priorities.261 
Furthermore, the concept of the pivot to Asia became popular among politicians and 
decision makers in the United States, and they, along with the United States’ tight military 
budget, did not allow the Pentagon to have large forces in both Asia and the 
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Gulf.262Therefore, the Gulf states have to be more self-dependent and more involved in the 
security process, which has led to the self-help concept of neorealism. Before we consider the 
concept of anarchy in the eyes of the Gulf and Iran, I want to review two major events 
mentioned earlier: the invasion of Iraq without UN authorization and the UN sanctions against 
Iran. As a result of these, the Iranian regime believes there is no higher formal authority that 
can fairly deal with Iran, while the Gulf States believe that, if the United States has no more 
interest in the region, nobody will care whether Iran attacks the sovereignty of the GCC. 
Regarding self-help, both competitors (Saudi Arabia and Iran) have found themselves in the 
position of needing to be more dependent on self-power and their capabilities to protect their 
existence. Regarding internal balance, the military and economic capabilities of the GCC are 
much higher than those of Iran; for example, the UAE’s air forces could destroy Iran’s old air 
forces in several hours.263 Therefore, Iran tries to compensate for its weakness in conventional 
power through asymmetric warfare, which is considered one of the fundamentals of Iranian 
military doctrine.264 
It is important to mention that security is responsible for drawing Iranian behavior 
toward other states more than ideology or economy; otherwise, there is no good explanation 
for Iran to cooperate with Al-Qaeda, which has a totally conflicting ideology, or for Iran to 
occupy UAE islands when Dubai is the most important trade partner in the region.265 
Gulf rulers in the past used techniques to keep the balance of power or status quo in 
Iran, including chain ganging, which was the idea behind creating the GCC. They also used 
passing the buck effectively, either by supporting Saddam during the Iraq–Iran war or by 
letting the United States take the major role in Gulf security arrangements.266 
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Recently, however, Saudi Arabia techniques to keep the balance of power with Iran 
have caused it to adopt an assertive (offensive) and a determinedly neorealist doctrine to 
maintain the status quo in the region.267 For example, it took steps to develop its military 
capabilities and hiked its military spending dramatically in recent years268 (the best single 
indicator of military power is one’s defense budget). It also tried to change the map of 
alliances in the Middle East by forming a pan-Arab force and creating a new coalition, 
including the GCC plus Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan, which played a role in Operation 
Decisive Storm in Yemen (new chain ganging) in confronting Iranian expansion in the Arab 
world.269 
Thus, the GCC, in order to ensure some kind of self-defense ability and independence 
from the United States, started to spend more on arms deals. For example, Gulf oil producers 
pumped nearly $130 billion into the military sector in 2012 as they pushed ahead with a drive 
to bolster their defense, according to Western data.270 
In addition, the GCC will have a new force of 100,000 members. “There will be a 
unified command of around 100,000 members, God willing. I hope it will happen soon, and 
the National Guard is ready for anything that is asked of it,” Prince Miteb, the minister of the 
Saudi National Guard, was quoted as saying by the Saudi Press Agency.271 
The GCC has also planned to launch a joint military command.272 In addition, the Gulf 
is planning to establish an advanced and strong antiballistic missile shield to protect the GCC 
from Iranian missiles.273 The Gulf has become more active in security and military issues in 
the region; a good example was Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to defuse the threat of 
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the pro-Iranian group Houthis, as well as its active contribution and discussion in the 
formation of the new pan-Arab forces.274 
 
6.2 Operation Decisive Storm  
Yemen is one of the poorest Arab countries; is closest to the richest countries in the 
region, including the GCC; and shares a long border with Saudi Arabia and Oman.275 This is 
why the GCC interfered in the crisis and created what is called the Gulf Initiative to solve the 
Yemen crisis, especially to protect its borders. There are also active branches of Al-Qaeda on 
the Arabian Peninsula, so the stability of Yemen is an important factor in the war on terror. In 
addition, Yemen has a strategic location known as Bab-el-Mandeb, which is a strait located 
between Yemen and Djibouti and one of the most important routes for international trade.276 
After ex-President Saleh of Yemen was toppled and his regime collapsed in the 
Yemen uprisings, the transitional period passed to his vice president, Mansur Hadi. A 
presidential election was conducted, and Hadi became the president of Yemen. But Saleh was 
not happy about losing power after more than three decades of rule, so he made an alliance 
with the Houthi group, the ex-enemy of the Saleh regime, to destroy the democratic process in 
Yemen. At the same time, the Houthi group, which was backed by Iran, received 
encouragement from Iran to take over Yemen. The influence of Saleh on the Yemen Army 
and the Republican Guard was so strong that the Houthi group was able to take Yemeni cities 
one by one through military force, finally taking Sana’a. The Yemen Army didn’t fight back 
after the intervention of the Saleh group.277 
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The Houthi group put legitimate President Hadi and his prime minister under house 
arrest. It infiltrated the governmental organizations and ministries and started to move south 
to occupy the rest of Yemen. President Hadi escaped from Sana’a, moved to Aden, and made 
it temporarily to the capital, but the Houthi and Saleh groups followed him and started to 
attack Aden, therefore Saudi Arabia and the GCC (except for Oman), as well as some other 
Arab countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan, created a coalition (new chain 
ganging) that started a military airstrike called Operation Decisive Storm on the night of 
March 25, 2015, to protect legitimacy in Yemen and to bring different Yemeni parties back to 
the political process.278 
Hundreds of air fighters of new Arab coalition started the campaign to strike Houthis 
and ex-president Saleh’s loyalists. It is worth mentioning that Sudan had previously had a 
good relationship with Iran, and its joining the new alliance was considered a strong blow to 
Iranian policy in the region.279 It was the first time in decades that Sunni Arab states took the 
initiative to strike and counteract the influence of Iran in the Arab world.280 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Military spending in 2014 for the countries are participating in Decisive Storm 
of the two coalitions. 
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Source: "Sipri Military Expenditure Database." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(Sipri). 2015. 
6.3 The Pan-Arab Force 
The Arab League agreed to create a joint military force to counter extremism and 
political instability across the Middle East at a meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, on March 
29, 2015.281 
The joint force is scheduled to include more than 40,000 troops beyond the size of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s rapid reaction forces.282 It is likely to consist of 
500 to 1,000 soldiers from the air forces of the participating countries, 3,000 to 5,000 navy 
personnel, and about 35,000 ground forces.283 The ground troops of the joint force, which will 
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be under the leadership of the commander from Saudi Arabia, will be divided into three 
sections: special operations forces, rapid intervention forces, and rescue operations forces.284 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan have confirmed 
their contributions. These countries have become convinced that Iran is seeking further 
expansion in the region after its success in reaching a tentative agreement with Western 
nations over its nuclear program. Matthew Hedges (an expert in the region) said, “The birth of 
the joint Arab force came as a result of the lack of confidence of the Arab countries in their 
traditional allies.”285It is a chain-ganging strategy to counteract external threats. 
 
6.4 Strategies of the Competitor for Balance of Power and Deterrence 
When I applied the three models (multivariants) to measure the nation power of Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, I looked for objective methods to compare the power of each party. As we 
can see from the results (Model 1: Saudi Arabia = 4.09, Iran = 3.198; Model 2: Saudi Arabia 
= 4.683, Iran = 2,681; Model 3: Saudi Arabia = 9.42, Iran = 2.61), all of the models confirmed 
that the national power of Saudi Arabia is larger than that of Iran. Therefore, Iran is trying to 
compete in two ways: First, it is pursuing asymmetric warfare because conventional national 
power is not in its favor; yet, asymmetric warfare is cheaper and does not follow the rules of 
conventional conflicts that depend on national power. Second, it is trying to reduce the effect 
of the United States on the balance of power in the Gulf via the negotiations over its nuclear 
program and influence in the Middle East. I mentioned previously when I explained balance 
of power that it is divided into internal and external types; the external type depends on 
alliances, and it is known that the United States is the biggest ally of the GCC. Thus, Iran is 
trying to remove the United States from the equation for the balance of power.286 
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Regarding the first Iranian strategy, there are many examples of asymmetric warfare 
involving Iran, but the most important is its support of violent, nonstate actors, such as 
Hezbollah and Houthi, to attack the interests of the GCC inside and outside the region. It also 
trained extremist Shia groups in the Gulf, such as in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.287 
Another strategy for Iran to compensate for its weakness in conventional military technology 
is the development of the Iranian ballistic missile program. Iran has tried for years to expand 
its ballistic missile arsenal, copying and developing techniques from North Korean 
missiles.288 It has problems with the accuracy and the guidance of missiles, however, which 
makes them strategically useless.289 Therefore, Iran depends on quantity over quality, 
attacking with a high number of missiles (saturation attacks) to overwhelm the GCC air 
defense systems.290 
The same strategy is used by Iran in a different field as well: its navy. Iran depends on 
swarm attack boats, which are fast, small, low-tech boats that can accumulate in large groups 
to attack one big naval vessel.291 It also has a large number of small, midget submarines.292 
Iran hopes that these strategies will give it some kind of self-help advantage to survive and 
maximize its power in the international system.  
Regarding the second Iranian strategy, which is the reduction of US effect on the 
region, in the multivariant equations shown above, Saudi Arabia has more national power 
than Iran, which raises the following question: Why does the GCC need the United States in 
the region? The explanation is twofold. The first deterrence, the presence of US power plus 
Saudi power in the region, is equal to more than ten times the Iranian power, as calculated 
before, which gives extended deterrence. The second point is that Iran can wage attacks on 
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the Gulf even if it knows it is weaker in conventional power because Iranians believe they 
have the ability to tolerate higher causalities and economic losses than the Gulf 
States.293Michael Eisenstadt described it as Iranian Iran high threshold of pain or insensitive 
to lost294, Iran believes that it has higher threshold of pain as country than Saudis Therefore, 
even if the Gulf States win, they cannot tolerate smaller causalities like Iran can. This 
behavior was clear in the Iran–Iraq War, when Iran used the technique of human waves, 
despite its very high human cost.295 Iran lost one million people, while Iraq only lost about a 
quarter to a third of this number.296 However, there is no land connection between Iran and 
the Gulf; therefore, there is no application for human waves in a potential dispute, and this 
may explain why Iran has concentrated on the southern part of Iraq and has increased its 
influence: It will give Iran a land connection to the Gulf.297 But if we add the national power 
of the Gulf States, mainly Saudi Arabia, and the US power together, they would cause huge 
and rapid destruction and very high causalities for Iran that even its high capacity for 
causalities could not tolerate. Thus, the presence of the United States in the region is 
considered a huge deterrence to any uncalculated venture of Iran toward the Gulf.  
To counteract the Iranian plan, the GCC moved in two ways, first by increasing 
military expenditures and expanding military capabilities, and second by reshaping the map of 
alliances in the Middle East. A good example was the creation of new pan-Arab forces and 
taking the lead, as was seen in Operation Decisive Storm. It is important to note that the Saudi 
Arabia is taking initiative to protect its interests (offensive doctrine) is a significant 
development which refers to the change in the attitude. Part of Cline’s formula to measure 
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national power is national will (W), and the Saudi Arabia’s will was shown clearly in 
Operation Decisive Storm and the pan-Arab forces.  
Another important step showing the new assertiveness of Gulf policy is the oil-price 
war; the GCC plans to keep America dependent on Middle Eastern oil, which, accordingly, 
will maintain protection for the region.298 The Gulf has counteracted shale oil producers by 
reducing the price of oil to such a degree that many shale oil companies cannot afford to 
extract it.299 As is known to oil experts, shale oil is expensive to produce compared to oil in 
the Gulf region.300 Therefore, OPEC, which is controlled by Saudi Arabia, refused to decrease 
its production to defend the price.301 Saudi Arabia has changed its policy dramatically from 
defending the price to defending the market share, which means the biggest loser of the price 
war is shale oil. Only the most efficient producers can survive. As a result, oil prices 
plummeted by more than 50% over a few months,302 making it difficult for US shale oil 
companies to compete. Furthermore, it is difficult for banks to give loans for further drilling, 
and it is just a matter of time before many shale oil companies leave the market, which will 
give the GCC back the leading role in oil policy.303It is obvious that the drop in the oil price 
will affect the GCC because they depend mainly on oil their governmental budgets but they 
have huge foreign reserves that were accumulated during past period of high oil price which 
gives GCC the flexibility to survive in low petroleum price for a while until the shale oil 
companies collapse. This will keep the United States dependent on Gulf oil, which will lead in 
turn to keeping the United States in the region to defend its interests. Gulf States is requesting 
effective US role in the region, and the GCC want to see US is involving in Middle East 
affairs and problems and seeking actively the solutions.Even if US keeps some forces in the 
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region, it is not assuring unless they are engaging in the region’s crises, otherwise it is US 
withdrawing in the eyes of Gulf officials.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
I conclude that the answer to my research question is yes, developments in the Middle 
East, such as the Arab uprisings and US withdrawing from the Gulf region due to shale oil 
revolution and pivot to Asia(reduction of extended deterrence of US), have forced Saudi 
Arabia, to adopt new, more assertive (offensive) neorealist policies and more self-dependent 
political actions to counteract Iran. After the recent major developments and its 
sequences,(indirect effects of Arab Uprisings and shale revolution) GCC (mainly Saudi 
Arabia) has taken several steps to enforce its military forces, which have been shown by the 
huge surge in military spending and massive arms deals (internal balance) that the GCC 
signed to upgrade its military capabilities as well as the establishment of an integrated 
ballistic missiles shield to protect the Gulf from Iranian missiles. 
On the other side, Iran has tried to reduce the US effects in the region by signing the 
nuclear agreement(external balance ), which will open a channel between the United States 
and Iran to discuss the political issues of the Middle East and will unfreeze tremendous 
amounts of Iranian money that will enrich the its economy (internal balance ). As a result, 
Iran will be able to use some of this money to augment its own military spending to support 
its asymmetric warfare, mainly through proxy wars in the Middle East, and in later stages, 
Iran will be able to access the international weapons market after the sanctions are lifted. 
Despite the United States’ rejection of claims that it is withdrawing from the region because 
of the rebalance of a pivot to Asia and the shale oil revolution, it is obvious that the United 
States has not interfered in the major current crises to hit the area, such as the Syrian War, or 
has only minimally interfered, such as in the war in Yemen. Alternatively, in recent years, 
Saudi Arabia has taken the lead in many crises in the region without dependence on US forces 
(e.g., the Pan-Arab forces and Operation Decisive Storm (new chain ganging), which 
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included many Arab states and was a significant development in the Arab world (external 
balance)). Furthermore, Arabs, mainly in Gulf States, are, for the first time in decades, taking 
responsibility for regional security without US help. These developments have clearly shown 
the new changes in the Gulf’s political behavior and attitude in attempts to regain the balance 
of power in the region and keep the status quo. The confrontation between the Saudi Arabia 
and Iran has become semidirect and hostile in many places, such as Syria and Yemen in an 
unprecedented way. And not to mention international circumstances and new players in the 
international stage due to the weakness of the United States globally, which will lead to the 
emergence of Russia and China, which, in turn, will lead to a multipolar system. As 
mentioned before, a multipolar system is the least stable system in international politics; 
therefore, the levels and the nature of the conflicts in the region are expected to become more 
aggressive and more complicated.  
To discuss the present nature of the dispute, we need to review the past. As I discussed 
in the beginning of this research, the roots of the dispute are very old and constitute part of the 
culture and civilization of both parties. If we add the sectarian factor, we should not expect 
any kind of truce or reconciliation soon. The Gulf region has throughout history been afflicted 
with conflict over power, resources, and ideologies, and this stage in history is not 
exceptional,304 especially with the new Saudi Arabian assertive doctrine (offensive) to keep 
the status quo in its favor, and the existence of Iran as a theocratic regime with a desire for 
expansion. Khomeini’s revolution made it clear that the expansionist desire is one of the 
regime’s main principles, and it is difficult for whoever is leading Iran to change Khomeini 
commandments. Furthermore, Iran has recently made Saudi Arabia its number one enemy—
instead of the United States and/or Israel—especially since the beginning of warmer relations 
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with the United States following the nuclear agreement.305 It is worth mentioning that the 
Iranian regime depends on hardliners and conservatives for its survival because they make up 
the majority of its supporters, and this type of supporter needs potential enemies with a 
different ideology to that of Iran and its revolutionary beliefs. In this case, the enemy is Saudi 
Arabia. The confrontation between the expansionist and status quo states is a classical dispute 
from a realist prospective and will continue unless major changes occur in either of the 
competitors or if they modify their behavior. The balance of power in the Gulf region has 
traditionally been managed through a conventional balance of power policy, but the retreating 
of the United States from the region has changed the variables of the policy, which has 
changed the struggle from one of expansionist behavior versus the status quo to offensive 
behavior versus offensive behavior. It is true that the current administration in the White 
House considers the nuclear agreement with Iran an achievement, but at the same time, it has 
increased the intensity of the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran. US administration 
knows that most of the work will be on the shoulders of the next American administration, 
since Obama’s administration is in its final stretch; therefore, any Iranian breach of the 
agreement will be left to the next US government to deal with, which is not convenient 
assurance for the Gulf States. As a result, Saudi Arabia has tried to make a new sort of 
deterrence, as we know one of the main element of Balance of power is deterrence.306And 
Saudis believe it will ensure the safety of Saudis and GCC and will protect their interests, As 
Paul Huth mentioned in his definition of deterrence, is a type of threat to convince other not 
do or initiation some kind of action,307 and in our case in this paper means the provocative 
Iranian action from toward Saudis, taking in consideration principle of Iran revolution is the 
expansion (export of revolution) to other country and on the other hand Saudis look for keep 
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sovereignty and integration of GCC. Therefore Saudi Arabia is attempting actively to shape 
this deterrence. To form the reliable deterrence, state should have two important factors, first, 
the capabilities such as military or political power and second, the ability to use this 
capabilities such as the will for implementation of threat.308 Saudis work hard recently on the 
capabilities as this research showed for the cause of huge rising in military spending last 
several years, and they showed the will during last year by interfering in Yemen war to 
actively to protect their interest. Furthermore  deterrence it can be further divided into  three 
categories, type one which direct attack deterrence ,type two which prevent the opponent from 
starting very provocative act and type three deterrence, 'tit-for-tat deterrence' makes the 
opponent is afraid of getting no profit due to the reaction of the deterrent such responding by 
limited military action.309 In Saudi-Iranian case, the deterrence that Saudis are looking for 
includes mainly type two and type three deterrence and for sure type one is must although it is 
uncommon to occur. Beside this to explore more in details of deterrence form that Saudi is 
seeking for, this will lead us to other classification of deterrence that was put by Nigel 
Morgan, the general deterrence and immediate deterrence. While General deterrence describe 
the relation between the adversaries in usual competing circumstances that keep status of no 
conflict (no-action) between the parties while the immediate deterrence is describing the 
situation when there is high likely attempt of attack from the opponent while other party 
launching threat to prevent it.310For Saudis they want to keep general deterrence as the norm 
in their relation with current Iranian leaders while the latter deterrence is the exception but is 
needed in case of rapid deterioration of the relation or in case of crisis. Saudi Arabia is 
attempting by creating the Arab coalition will pose some kind of deterrence, Saudis showed 
great enthusiasm to invite the GCC and other Arab states to create pan-Arab forces and to 
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engage in Operation Decisive Storm. Though this does not compare to the extended 
deterrence of the United States, at least the sum of military spending for GCC and other Arab 
states will be huge. Also, it fills the gap in one of Waltz’s elements of power, which is 
population. As we know, Iran has a larger population than Saudi Arabia, but the sum of the 
Arab states population is participating in Decisive Storm is higher than Iran. Therefore, I can 
see from the events that there are obvious changes in the powerand the attitude of Saudi 
Arabia. There has been a change of power in terms of military capabilities, internal and 
external, and a change of attitude in terms of offensive doctrine. However, in the Iranian case, 
it is expected that the Iranian regime will improve its capabilities after accessing money from 
previously frozen assets and will continue to compete with Saudi Arabia. It is worth 
mentioning that despite the newly assertive Saudi Arabian doctrine, the GCC is not one 
unified body in its policy in terms of how to deal with Iran; Oman is often an exception, and 
the Yemen War is a good example, as Omanis have refused to join the rest of the GCC in 
Decisive Storm. It is important to consider that the end results of the Syrian and Yemeni wars 
will be vital for both parties (external balance) and will reform the balance of power in the 
Gulf region in favor of either the GCC or Iran. However, the competition, according to 
current indicators, seems heated. Although the traditional policy of the balance of power is 
expected to continue, the main equation of politics in the region will remain as it has been in 
the past.311 
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Tables 
Table 5.1. Saudi land forces equipment. 
Military Products in Service 
Quantity 
 155 GCT (Self-propelled howitzer) 50 
 Al Fahd AF-40-8 (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 100 
 AML (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 235 
 AMX-10P (Infantry fighting vehicle) 570 
 AMX-30 (Armored vehicle-launched bridge) 12 
 AMX-30 CET (Main battle tank) 51 
 AMX-30 S (Main battle tank) 572 
 AMX-30D (Repair and recovery vehicle) 57 
 ARAVIS (Tactical vehicle) 73 
 Astros-2 (Multiple rocket launcher) 60 
 BMP-3 (Infantry fighting vehicle) 238 
 BMR (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 140 
 BMR-2 / BMR-600 (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 140 
 Bradley M2/M3 (Infantry fighting vehicle) 400 
 CAESAR (Self-propelled gun) 132 
 COBRA (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 98 
 Dragon (Anti-tank guided missile launcher) 100 
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 EE-11 URUTU (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 20 
 FGM-148 Javelin (Anti-tank guided missile launcher) 100 
 FH70 (Towed howitzer) 72 
 HOT (Anti-tank guided missile launcher) 50 
 LAV III Kodiak (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 1130 
 LAV-150 (Modernization of the vehicle) 1100 
 LAV-150 Commando (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 1100 
 LAV-25 Coyote (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 352 
 M-114 (Towed howitzer) 50 
 M101 (Howitzer) 100 
 M102 (Towed howitzer) 48 
 M109A1 (Self-propelled howitzer) 280 
 M113A3 (Tracked armored personnel carrier) 1700 
 M198 (Howitzer) 90 
 M1A2 Abrams (Main battle tank) 400 
 M3 (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 150 
 M60A3 (Modernization of the vehicle) 460 
 M901 (Self-propelled guided missile system) 335 
 Piranha 8x8 (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 160 
 Piranha ACV (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 140 
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 PLZ-45 (Self-propelled howitzer) 54 
 Tactica (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 261 
 TOW BGM-71 (Anti-tank guided missile launcher) 200 
 TPK 420 VBL (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 10 
 TR (Towed gun) 28 
 UR-416 M (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 100 
 VCC-1 (Infantry fighting vehicle) 200 
Source: “Country Information, Saudi Arabia,” Army-Guide, 2015, http://www.army-
guide.com/eng/countrys.php?countryID=67. 
 
Table 5.2. Iranian land forces equipment. 
 9K331 Tor-M1 (Anti-aircraft system) 29 
 9M133 Konkurs/Spandrel (Anti-tank guided missile launcher) 130 
 BM-21 9K51 GRAD (Multiple rocket launcher) 64 
 BMP-1 (Infantry fighting vehicle) 300 
 BMP-2 (Infantry fighting vehicle) 200 
 Boraq / Boragh (Tracked armored personnel carrier) 180 
 BTR-152 (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 320 
 BTR-60 (Wheeled armored personnel carrier) 300 
 BTR-60 (Modernization of the vehicle) 30 
 Chieftain Mk5 (Main battle tank) 200 
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 Chieftain (Main battle tank) 100 
 D-20 KHITIN (Towed howitzer) 30 
 EE-9 CASCAVEL (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 40 
 Fadjr-5 (Multiple rocket launcher) 5 
 Ferret Mk 1/1 (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 20 
 Fox (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 20 
 FV101 Scorpion CVR(T) (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 80 
 FV101 Scorpion CVR(T) (Reconnaissance Vehicle) 50 
 G5 (Gun-howitzer) 100 
 GH N-45 (Gun-howitzer) 120 
 M101 (Howitzer) 700 
 M107 (Self-propelled howitzer) 200 
 M113A3 (Tracked armored personnel carrier) 300 
 M48 (Main battle tank) 80 
 M60A1 (Modernization of the vehicle) 50 
 T-55 (Main battle tank) 110 
 T-62 (Main battle tank) 200 
 T-72 (Main battle tank) 250 
 Tupe 59 (Towed howitzer) 1100 
 Type 54-1 (Towed howitzer) 100 
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 Type 59 (Main battle tank) 220 
 Type 69 (Main battle tank) 200 
 Type WA 021 / WAC 21 (Towed howitzer) 15 
 ZSU-23-4 Shilka-M (Anti-aircraft system) 30 
 Zulfiqar (Main battle tank) 4 
Source: “Country Information, Iran,” Army-Guide, 2015, http://www.army-
guide.com/eng/countrys.php?countryID=59. 
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Figure 3. Role of law and the control of corruption in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Source: “The Worldwide Governance Indicators, Saudi Arabia,” World Bank, 2014. 
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Some of the Interviewees 
A-Mr. Salman Al–Dosaary (editor in chief of Alsharq Al-Awsat [a pan-Arab newspaper]), in 
discussions with the author, December 17, 2013, Riyadh. 
B- Dr. Abdullah Al-shammari (former diplomat, lecturer, and political analyst in politics of 
the region), in discussion with the author, December 21, 2013, Riyadh. 
C- Mr. Yoseef Alkowaileet (deputy editor in chief of AlriyadhNewspaper), in discussion with 
the author, December, 23, 2013, Riyadh. 
 
 
Notice:  
Some military spending numbers and the values of other variables are secretive or 
unavailable, therefore it is difficult to obtain, I have tried in this research to look for 
more than one reliable  resource but if it was not available, then I couldn’t but to select 
last available figures. 
 
Calculations: 
 
Military spending in million USD, according to Sipri. 
period Tunisia Egypt Libya Yemen Syria The 
average 
Pre-
Uprisings 
602 4596 1338 1731 2366 2126 
post- 
Uprisings 
929 4961 2997 1715 2495 2619 
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Source:"Sipri Military Expenditure Database." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(Sipri). 2015. 
 
The weight of country= military spending ÷the average  
Example; Tunisia’s weight Pre- Uprising = 602 ÷2126 = 0.28 
                Tunisia’s weight Post- Uprising = 928 ÷2619 = 0.35 
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